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Summary : The aim of this review is to provide a preliminary assessment of the implementation
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in order to highlight the directions that
might take the next stage of reform. A particular focus is made on the Quads
1 countries. Our findings
are that, in spite of the URAA arrangements, tariffs on agricultural products are still three times
higher on average than on manufactured products. The  tariffication process has often led to
prohibitive duties and to an increase in tariff dispersion. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have not always
been filled and market access has shown only limited improvement. Export subsidies still exist and
domestic farm policies have often experienced only minor changes to match the Agreement
requirements. These points, which have been identified as live issues for the next Round of
Negotiations, are then debated in the rest of the document. We discuss in particular the modalities of
ameliorating market access, with the definition of a more effective tariff cut and the improvement of
TRQs’ administration and efficiency. As far as exports are concerned, we tackle the issue of
effectiveness of a new reduction of export subsidies, the status of export credit and of export
restrictions. The more general question of state involvement in agricultural trade is also discussed.
Finally, we pose the question of a deepening of the reduction of support to agriculture, with an
elimination of the “blue box” and a new definition of the “green box” content.
Key words : WTO, trade negotiations, agriculture, market access, export subsidies, support to
agriculture.
                                                          
1 Quads countries are constituted by Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United Sates.
* The authors would like to acknowledge support from the EU Fair 97 ct 3481 project.2
I- INTRODUCTION
Agriculture has always been a politically sensible topic as far as international trade is
concerned as 40 percent of the multilateral disputes brought to the GATT has originated in this sector,
this percentage having reached 60 percent in the 80s. Until the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (URAA) signed in Marrakech in 1994, this sector benefited from a special treatment
which made it possible to escape the liberalisation process. In this context, the URAA constituted an
historical turning point in the reform of the agricultural trade system.
URAA commitments in the area of market access, export competition and domestic support,
have represented a fundamental deviation from the way agriculture had traditionally been considered.
As a result, the URAA has been recognised as a serious move toward liberalisation of agricultural
markets. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement arrangements make it more
difficult to escape from the common discipline. As a result, WTO commitments have generally been
considered seriously and completed correctly by the various member countries, even though the
various reports of the WTO Commitee of agriculture show that a lot of grey areas persist as far as the
technical aspects of the URAA implementation.
In spite of the URAA arrangements, tariffs on agricultural products are still three times higher
on average than on manufactured products. The  tariffication process has often led to prohibitive
duties and to an increase in tariff dispersion. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have not always been filled
and market access has shown only limited improvement. Export subsidies still exist and domestic
farm policies have often experienced only minor changes to match the Agreement requirements.
Many countries have used any opportunities for lessening the impact of the agreement as far as import
restrictions are concerned.
In this context, the aim of this review is to provide a preliminary assessment of the
implementation of the URAA in order to highlight the directions that might take the next stage of
reform with a particular focus on Quads countries. Hence, after summarising the main elements of the
Agreement, we will focus on those points which implementation have been identified as live issues
and which might be a subject of concern during the next talks. Particularly, we will tackle the
question of market access with the modalities of the new tariff cuts and the administration and
efficiency of the TRQs, of exports with the reduction of export subsidies, the status of export credit
and the issue of export restrictions, as well as the question of the re-instrumentation of domestic
support.
II-THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE URAA
The Agreement on Agriculture issued from the Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the Uruguay
Round (WTO, 1995) contains the general commitments of the countries in terms of market access,
export competition and domestic support, as well as each country’s schedules as part of its contractual
commitment. Aside the URAA, the Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding
Commitments under the Reform Programme (“ Modalities ”) do not form part of the Agreement and
cannot be used as the basis for dispute settlement proceedings (this is the case for example for the
minimum access provisions that are not necessary included in the Agreement). Two separate
Agreements concern the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), as well as the Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT). Theses two Agreements are not discussed here.
II.1.- Market Access
Market access improvements were a core element of the URAA and of the WTO system as a
whole. The market access provisions are:
•  The conversion of all non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to tariffs (i.e. the “ tariffication ” process)
based on the 1986-88 difference between average internal and world market prices. This3
measure has been completed for the commodities concerned by (at least) the maintain of
the current access of domestic market (in order to tariffication not to reduce trade flows), as
well as by the definition of a minimum access of 3 percent of 1986-88 consumption, to be
increased to 5 percent at the end of the implementation period (2000). These minimum
access objectives are reached by using Tariff-Rate Quotas ( TRQs), i.e. defined import
quantities with a reduced tariff rate. The minimum access should in principle be achieved
through low tariffs applied to the quantities concerned. Current access must be maintained,
in practice also through TRQs.
•  The binding of all tariffs, that is to say the fixation for each commodity of the maximum
tariff to be applied (defined as “ bound ” tariff), and the reduction of 36 percent (24 percent
for Developing Countries (DC)) of average tariffs over a 6 years period (10 years for the
DC), with a 15 percent minimum cut (10 percent for DC) per tariff line, generally in five
equal annual reductions. Least Developed Countries (LDC) are not subject to this
obligation.
•  The definition of Special Safeguard Provisions (SSP), which allow the application of
additional duties on tarified commodities imported when their increase in volume or their
drop in price exceeds certain trigger level
2. These provisions apply only to imports over
tariff-quota volumes. Additional duty may, however, not exceed one-third of the ordinary
duty and may only be maintained until the end of the year during which it has been
imposed
3.
•  The definition of Special Treatment conditions (ST), which allow not to apply the
tariffication process to commodities (defined in the Agreement) on fulfilment of certain
conditions (such as for example a minimum access going from 4 percent to 8 percent of
1986-88 consumption during the implementation period). The continuation of the Special
Treatment provisions after the implementation period is submitted to additional
concessions to be determined during the new Round of Negotiations.
II.2. Export Commitments
If the high level of protection was the main concern of the negotiations on Agriculture, export
subsidies have long been identified as particularly damaging for agricultural markets and the focus of
earliest attention of the GATT. The main commitments of the countries in the area of export consist
in:
•  The reduction by 21 percent (14 percent for DC) of quantities exported with subsidies and
by 36 percent (24 percent in the case of DC) of budget expenditures on export subsidies
over a six years period (10 years for DC) from the 1986-90 level (1990-91 if budget and
quantities are for this period higher than during the base period). The Agreement allows to
withhold the non used quota of export subsidies up to 2001. LDC are exempted from these
obligations.
•  The prohibition of new programs of export subsidy.
•  A commitment to work toward internationally agreed disciplines on export credits and to
observe certain practices concerning food aid (which for example should not to be tied to
                                                          
 
2 The safeguards are triggered if the volume of imports exceeds the average of the previous 3 years by a certain
percentage (which differs depending on the imports’ proportion of consumption) or if the price of the imported
product drops at least 10 percent below the base period (1986-88) world reference price.
 
 
3 The extent to which the duty can be increased is on a sliding scale.
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commercial exports and should be conducted following FAO Principles of Surplus
Disposal and Consultative Obligations).
•  The consideration of the effects on food security of export prohibitions and export
restrictions, the consultation of the importing countries concerned and the advance notice to
the Committee on Agriculture.
II.3. Domestic Support
Through the URAA, domestic policies appear for the first time a legitimate concern of trade
talks. The main provisions in the area of domestic subsidies can be summarised in:
•  The measurement of domestic support (aggregated across all commodities) through a Total
Aggregate Measure of Support (Total AMS). This indicator is supposed to include all
distorting subsidies (defined as belonging to the “ Amber Box ”) going from price to direct
support, which motivate producers to increase or decrease current resource use or current
production. These incentives are known as “coupled” incentives
4. Non distorting support
(or “decoupled” support) is defined in the Annex of the Agreement as constituting the
“Green Box”
5. Domestic support minimally trade distorting (called “de  Minimis”
exemptions)
6 or aimed at limiting production
7 (defined as belonging to the “ Blue Box ”)
are temporary excluded (up to 2000) from the AMS. For DC, support to encourage
agricultural and rural development, as well as investment and input subsidies are exempted
from AMS reduction. All new or modified domestic policies for which exemption is
claimed have to be notified to WTO.
•  The reduction of 20 percent (13 percent for DC) referring to 1986-88 (1986 if Total AMS is
higher this year) of Total AMS by the year 2000 (2005 for DC). LDC cannot exceed 1986-
88 level.
•  The introduction of a Due Restraint provision or “ Peace Clause ”, which specifies that
domestic and export policies will not be contested up to 2003, as far as the countries are in
full conformity with their commitments under the URAA and that 1992 level is not
exceeded.
                                                          
 
4 Examples of “coupled” subsidies are administered price supports, input subsidies or direct per unit payments.
When support is “ decoupled ”, farmers base their production decisions on expected market return, and not on
expected government support. As stipulated by the Agreement, (§ 6, Annex 2) “The amount of decoupled
payments in a given year shall not be related to the type or volume of production … neither  to the price … or




5 The list of subsidies excluded from AMS consists in a wide range of general services (training, extension,
marketing, promotion, research), domestic food aid, decoupled income support, government financing of income
insurance and income safety net programmes, structural adjustment assistance, environmental payments and
regional assistance programmes. These exemptions rely in particular on the political need of governments to deal
with questions of equity (aid and food security), market failure (environmental programs) and the absence or
inadequacies of risk markets (insurance and income safety net programs).
 
 
6 Defined principally as product specific support which amounts to less than 5 percent of the value of the product




7 In particular, if such payments are based on a fixed area, a fixed yields or a fixed number of head; or are made
on 85 percent or less of the 1986-88 base level of production (these forms of support are part of the Blair House
Agreement).5
III-THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
III.1. Market Access
As a first evaluation of the market access provisions, various studies have pointed out that ￿ in
spite of the highly significant potential benefits in the long term  ￿ the impact during the
implementation period would be low (IATRC, 1994 and 1997 ;  Josling, 1998 ; OECD, 1995 ;
Tangermann, 1995 and 1996). In the short term, it has been shown that the almost all countries have
acted in order to minimise the constraints of the Agreement, using a combination of factors that are
going to be discussed into more details.
III.1.1-Tariffication and Conversion of Non Tariff-Barriers (NTBs)
Thanks to  tariffication, tariff structures are more predictable and they provide a more
transparent basis for further reductions. This commitment constitutes a fundamental change for
agricultural trade policies, countries being no longer allowed to implement an extensive quantity of
border measures such as quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import
prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measure through state trading or voluntary exports
restraints. According to OECD (1997), in almost all countries fewer imported products faced NTBs in
1996 than in 1993.
A number of factors has however reduced the immediate importance of commitments and
explain their low impact in terms of trade flow. Some countries such as Japan, Korea and Philippines
(for rice) and Israel (for various products) have benefited from the Special Treatment (ST) provisions
which exempt them of tariffication of the products concerned.
More important, most of the countries has set many new tariffs at a higher level of protection
than the true tariffs equivalent of the NTBs that they replaced ￿ the highest levels being recorded in
the most sensitive sectors (such as sugar and dairy products for example, tables A1 to A4 in Annex).
This has been partly due to the period of reference chosen for the tariffication process (1986-88),
world prices being very low during this period of time. But in addition, some countries overstated
their domestic prices level or understated measures of world prices level, increasing artificially the
apparent gap between domestic and world price  ￿ and consequently the new tariffs established
(Finger and alii, 1996)
8.
This phenomenon ￿ denominated “ dirty ” tariffication ￿ has led to an unused protection
identified as the “ water ” in the tariff. In fact, this has been a general characteristic of the principle of
bound tariffs that have followed URAA implementation. This has also resulted in an increase in the
(already high) tariff dispersion, as well as of the important number of tariff peaks (OECD, 1995 and
1997).
Hence, in the majority of non OECD countries, post-URAA bound tariff rates have remained
much higher than applied MFN tariffs (OCDE, 1999a). In some countries, for a certain number of
commodities MFN applied tariffs are higher than actual protection as measured by the Nominal
Protection Coefficient (NPC). This has been particularly true for Canada and the EU (table 1). This
situation, in addition of giving the possibility to increase applied tariffs when necessary, can lead to a
further reduction of the bound tariffs without improving market access.
The problem of persistent tariff peaks have also been raised by many observers. The welfare
losses associated with tariffs is not only a function of the mean tariff rates, but also depend on the
variance in these rates across products. For a given tariff average, the higher the dispersion, the larger
are the  distortionary effects of tariffs. Moreover, tariff uniformity makes the trade regime more
transparent and easier to administer (Panagariya and Rodrik, 1993). Two indicators of the degree of
                                                          
8 This discretionary procedures used when consolidating tariffs at a higher level than the tariff in operation has
been particularly used by some Developing Countries (DC).6
dispersion are commonly used. One is the standard deviation of tariffs from their mean, the other one
is the tariff "spikes" or "peaks" which is the proportion of items for which the tariff rate exceeds a
reference level. Tariff rates in excess of a given national reference is defined as “domestic peaks”,
“international spikes” referring to tariffs which exceed 15 percent.
Using national definitions, “domestic peaks” were in 1996 5 percent in Canada, 9 percent in the
US, 22 percent in Japan and 28 percent in the EU (these percentages being respectively of 5, 7, 22 and
36 when using international definition as the one used by OECD, 1999a). The majority of non-OECD
countries shows high shares of tariff peaks when using international definition (between 90 and 100
percent of commodities). The largest number of tariff peaks are also found in agriculture (compared to
industrial sector). In fact, these peaks have increased for most countries in 1996 relative to 1993, the
EU showing one of the most important expansion. Agricultural sector exhibits also above average
standard deviations of tariff rates, this indicator having also augmented for most OECD countries
from 1993 to 1996 (OECD, 1997 and 1999b).
Table 1. Applied Tariffs and Protection Rates in Selected OECD
Countries
(in %) Applied Tariffs NPC
Canada (1996) Wheat 86 0
Barley 106 0
Butter 351 147









Some very well-known examples of peak tariffs are the ones of sugar and dairy products (see
tables A1 to A4 in Annex). In Japan, ad valorem equivalents of tariffs on butter reached 650 percent
in 1995, these rates being of respectively 350 percent, 250 percent and 140 percent in the case of
Canada, the EU and the US. As far as sugar is concerned, tariffs were of 274 percent in the EU, 252
percent in Japan, and 216 percent in the US. In Japan and the EU, wheat and beef markets show also
high levels of protection, with tariffs of 280 percent for wheat in Japan and of more than 150 in the
EU, as well as of 174 percent for beef in the EU and of 93 percent in Japan. In this context, there is
little doubt that agricultural protection as evidenced by these high tariffs remains one of the major
distortion in the world economy.
Another bias of the tariffication process can be seen in the frequent conversion of the NTBs
into specific duties in the place of ad valorem tariffs. This has been the case of Japan and Canada, but
the US and the EU are still among the countries using the most specific duties (table 2 and OECD,
1997 and 1999b). Specific duties provide a growing level of protection when world prices are falling
(which effect is worsening the world price declines). Moreover, specific duties offer a higher
protection to low unit value products. In fact, it is the complexity of the system (and less its
economical justification) that has been criticised, as well as its lack of transparency that generally
hides high levels of protection (tables A1 to A4 in Annex). Specific duties are consequently more
prevalent in the agriculture area than in other sectors (table 2 and tables A5 to A8 in Annex). All these
characteristics justify that countries have often used a combination of specific and ad valorem duties,
in order to offer a wide protection  to some of their production.
Although many of the tariffs resulting from the tariffication process appear to have been set at a
very high level, several factors have to be taken into consideration in order to assess the real level of7
protection. First, the trade restrictive effects of tariffication have been attenuated by the commitments
taken in term of current and minimum access. Also, these new tariffs have to be considered as
maxima, the applied tariffs being generally inferior. It is the case of most of the countries, which
choose to implement a lower tariff than the bound level  ￿ in particular through bilateral
arrangements. In fact, these high tariffs give, if necessary, the possibility to increase the duties, while
respecting URAA’s commitments.
Table 2. Specific and Compound Duties in Selected OECD
Countries
(in %) Agriculture Whole Economy
1993 1996 1993 1996
Canada 16 20 7 8
EU 30 33 12 12
Japan 9 14 5 7
US 33 34 17 16
Source: OECD (1999b)
III.1.2-Reduction of Tariffs
This issue can be considered as one of the most disappointing of the URAA. In fact, protection
does not seem to have been reduced. Simple and production weighted average of applied tariffs have
increased in most of the countries (Ingco, 1995). This is the case of the US (4.1 to 7.9 percent
between 1993 and 1996 for weighted tariffs), as well as of the EU (6.1 to 10.7). For Japan and
Canada, protection has been more stationary (respectively around 5 percent, and 4 to 5.5, OECD,
1997).
In spite of the difficulty in comparing countries experiences, various indicators show that, in
average, protection is still higher in the EU and Japan, than in the US and Canada. This can be
illustrated by the ratio of domestic to world prices (or Consumer Nominal Assistance Coefficient,
NAC) which goes in average for 1995-97 from 1.1-1.2 in the US and Canada, to about 1.4 in the EU
and almost 2 in Japan. Protection  has however slightly decreased since the 1986-88 base period,
where these coefficients amounted of respectively 1.2-1.3, 1.8 and  2.3 (OECD,1998), global
protection being globally 13 percent lower (Finger and alii, 1996).
Consequently, agriculture remains much more protected than industry. In most developed
countries and in an increasing number of middle-and low-income economies, many bound
manufacturing tariffs are about 5-10 percent, several countries with an average of less than 10 percent
(table 3). Agricultural tariffs by contrast can average more than 40 percent (table 3 and 4), with in
addition a greater dispersion of tariffs and particular high tariff peaks.
Table 3. Post-Uruguay Round Simple Bound AverageTariff Rates






Agriculture 4.6 19.5 11.7 5.5 8 42 63
Industry 5.3 4.1 3.6 3.8 4 14 39
Source: from OECD (1999b)
Table 4. Average Unweighted Ad-valorem Bound Tariff Rates (20 Countries)
Product Percent Product Percent
Grains 46.7 Dairy Products 47.1
Oilseeds 41.7 Sugar 48.7
Fats and Oils 41.6 Fresh Fruits and 35.58
Vegetables
Meats 39.3 Processed Fruit and
Vegetables
35.3
Milk 40.7 Other Agriculture 24.4
Source : Josling (1998)
This result can be explained by the way countries have applied their tariff reduction. Tariffs
being required to be reduced by a simple average of 36 percent (with a minimum of 15 percent), this
has been generally achieved by deep cuts of tariffs that were already low and minimum cuts to less
competitive sectors. This phenomena of “ dilution ” of tariffs reduction has been well studied (Josling
and Tangermann, 1994 ; Tangermann, 1996). Peak tariffs, in particular, can be seen as a major cause
of the global inefficiency of tariffs reduction, tariffs cut been less than the “ water ” in the tariff. This
process can be illustrated by some country experiences (tables A5 to A8 in Annex).
In the US, the relatively low tariffs applicable to cereals (except durum wheat) and oilseeds
have been bound and cut of 36 to 74 percent during the implementation period (16 percent for durum
wheat). On the contrary, in the more sensible sectors generally submitted to tariffication ￿ such as
sugar, beef and dairy products ￿ tariffs cuts were minimum (15 percent) and relatively high duties
will still be implemented in 2000. In the case of the EU, where a wide range of products have been
submitted to tariffication, tariffs cuts of 36 percent were applied in a more homogeneous way ￿
except for sugar and milk products where reduction did not exceed 20 percent. Tariffs will however
still be relatively high at the end of the implementation period (tables A5 to A8 in Annex).
For Canada, minimum tariffs reduction of 15 percent have been used to sensible products (such
as wheat and wheat products, barley, dairy, beef and veal, poultry). In most sectors submitted to
tariffication, relatively high tariffs will continue to be applied in 2000. Similarly in Japan, for almost
all tariffied commodities (wheat, barley, dairy products and pigmeat) tariffs cut was settled at the
minimum level of 15 percent and high tariffs will be used at the end of the implementation period.
III.1.3. Tariffication and Current-Minimum Access
Current and minimum access commitments were justified by the predictable high level of tariffs
that would result from the URAA implementation and that would question trade flow and market
access improvements. A total of 1366 TRQs were notified to the WTO. 36 countries were concerned
by these commitments
9 among which Norway (232 notifications) Poland (127), Iceland (90), the EU
(85), the US (54), Japan (21) and Canada (20). Such arrangements are particularly frequent for fruits
and vegetables (350), meat products (249), cereals (215), dairy products (182) and oilseed products
(124).
However, commitments were not very strict. Relevant provisions were not always included into
the schedules of the Agreement (provisions contained into the Modalities are not legally binding). In
addition, these provisions do not require a country to import a given volume, but rather to establish an
access opportunity. Moreover, pre-existing or new bilateral arrangements have been indirectly
allowed to be incorporated to the current access commitments (what is not really consistent with MFN
principles and has been criticised by various countries)
10.
                                                          
9 Countries having provided for increases in quota levels from base levels include Austria, Canada, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Czech Rep., Salvador, European Communities, Finland, Guatemala, Hungary, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovak Rep., South Africa,
Switzerland-Liechtenstein, Thailand, United States and Venezuela.
10 Articles 13 and 14 permit countries to allocate tariff-quota access to specific exporting countries under specific
conditions (WTO, 1995). The maintain of current access could in consequence incorporate some of the previous
bilateral agreements. However, annual notifications of TRQs to the WTO generally not distinguishing between
current and minimum access commitments, it is impossible to evaluate to which extent minimum access has been
filled through these pre-existing agreements.9
Some countries have also managed to lower their commitments by calculating the quota at a
broad level of product aggregation (such as “meat” or “dairy products”) and allocate the total TRQ
among the components of the aggregates in a way to minimise the effect on sensitive commodities. In
some cases, the aggregated quotas were not allocated to individual commodities, leaving flexibility to
allocate quantities based on market conditions. This justify why access opportunities have not always
fully translated into increased trade and why, in many cases, countries have not filled their quota.
Nevertheless, with respect to crop commodities, there has been some expansion in access under
the minimum access provisions, in particular for rice in Japan and Korea, maize in the EU and wheat
in Canada. There has also been increased access for dairy products and meat, specially in the EU but
also in the US. The important commitments made by the EU for butter, cheese, pigmeat, poultry and
beef have to be highlighted. In several circumstances, however, quantities reported in the EU schedule
reflect bilateral or  plurilateral agreements already in place (with Central and Eastern Europe for
example, Tangermann, 1995). This is the case, in particular, for some dairy and meat products.
In fact, the greatest beneficiaries from the current and minimum access provisions among
OECD countries appear to be New Zealand for dairy products and Australia for meat and some dairy
products. The US and Australia are gaining from increased opportunities to export rice in Japan and
Korea.
TRQs Fill Rates
TRQs fill rates were in average for WTO countries of 65, 63 and 46 percent respectively in
1995, 1996 and 1997 (table 7)
11. These averages hide a large degree of dispersion, more than half of
TRQs being highly filled (over 80 percent) and a quarter showing low fill rates (under 25 percent,
table 5). In fact, distribution of fill rates shows large fluctuations depending on the countries (table 7)
and the products (tables 6 and 8).
Table 5. Distribution of TRQs by Fill-Rates Categories
(in %) 1995 1996
0 to 20 24.3 26.6
20 to 80 21.4 21.4
80 to 105 26.3 30.6
over 105 28 21.4
Source: Analysis of WTO notifications
With respect to commodities, tobacco and fibres appear to be the least utilised  TRQs (46
percent over 1995-97). On the opposite, fruits and vegetables perform the highest fill rates (76 percent
on average). Following the average changes of fill rates by countries over time, the rate of utilisation
of TRQs declined for most products, particularly in the case of fibre, sugar and livestock. Fill rates
increased only for coffee and oilseeds.
Table 6. TRQs Fill-Rates by Product Category
(in %) 1995 1996 1997
Cereals 64 64 60
Dairy Products 67 68 63
Livestock 63 60 56
Oilseeds 60 60 64
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 It should be noticed that no allowance is made for differences in size between TRQs, a small TRQ being given
the same weighting as a large TRQ.10
Fruits and Vegetables 73 71 68
Sugar 72 64 59
Agricultural Fibbers 77 37 23
Tobacco 52 37 48
Coffee 44 61 70
Beverages 49 47 49
Other 67 62 62
OECD 66 64 62
Source: OECD (1999b)
As far as countries are concerned, Canada, the UE and Japan indicate above average fill rates
(respectively 82, 73 and 70 percent, against 58 for WTO countries for 1995-97, table 7). On the
opposite, the US perform rather low fill rates (55 percent).
In the EU, fill rates are low for drinks (4 percent), eggs (46 percent), fruits and vegetables (62
percent), and cereals (61 percent, table 8). This is the case of fibres (5.3 percent), coffee-tea (46.1
percent), fruits and vegetables (44 percent) and to a lesser extent dairy products (62 percent) in the
US. In Japan, oilseeds and dairy products (56 percent) exhibit rather low fill rates. Canada performs
exceptionally well, except for oilseeds (for which quota are not fill at all) and coarse grains (54
percent rate of fill).
Table 7. TRQs Fill-Rates for Selected Countries
(in %) 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average Number of TRQs
US 47.8 53.1 55.5 61.8 54.6 54
EU 76.3 70.5 72.7 na 73.3 85
Canada 78 85 83 na 82 20
Japan 69.5 71.5 69.6 na 70.2 21
WTO Average 65 63 46 na 58 1366
Source: Analysis of WTO notifications
Table 8. Countries TRQs Fill-Rates for Selected Products (average 1995-97)
(in %) US EU Canada Japan
Coarse grains 61 54 94
Dairy products 62 98 91 56
Meat products 68 80 100
Eggs 46 98
Oilseeds 96 2 56






Source: Analysis of WTO notifications
The rate of fill of TRQs depends on several factors related to the level of protection, as well as
on who receives the market rent and the extend of this market rent
12. In particular, the administrative
arrangements matter, and so do the within and beyond TRQs tariff rates, the TRQs quantity, supply
                                                          
12 Market rents arise from the difference between internal supported prices and the within TRQ tariff rate.
Depending of the administrative arrangements, these rents can be caught by importers, government or exporters.11
and demand conditions in importing and exporting countries, possible infrastructure constraints, and
world price levels.
TRQs Administration Methods
A major issue concerns the allocation and the administration of the TRQs. Countries have
basically two ways of allocating their TRQs: the first one is global, the second one is country-specific.
Global allocation apply on imports regardless of country of origin, all countries being free to compete.
Generally in this case, it is the importer which holds the quota and the importing country which
administrates it. Under country-specific allocation, the importing country grant one part of the TRQ to
an exporting country. Since the importers and the exporters already know from where the product will
originate, either country can administer the TRQ and catch the rent.
In addition, countries have adopted rather different approaches to administer their current and
minimum access commitments, which influence trade, prices, market rents and consequently fill rates.
Several possibilities exist. A country can decide not to allocate the TRQs and to choose between two
methods: applied tariffs or first-come first-served. Otherwise, allocation can follow different forms:
licenses on demand, historical importers, auctioning, lottery, state trading or producer groups or
associations (see Box 1 for definition and analysis of these administration methods).
Analysis of WTO notifications reveals that ￿ by far ￿ the two most frequent administrative
methods chosen by the countries are “applied tariffs” (for around half of TRQs) and “licenses on
demand” (for a quarter, table 9). “First-come first served” appears in less than 10 percent of the cases
and “historical importer” in 5 percent. In these cases, the large (or relative large) number of
observations allows to draw inference between fill rates and administrative methods. Less confidence
can be placed on other observations.
Table 9. TRQs by Allocation Methods
(% TRQs) 1995 1996 1997
Applied Tariffs 52 51 47
License on Demand 26 26 25
First-Come 8 8 7
Historical 4 5 5
Auction 3 2 2
State-Trading 2 2 1
Producer Groups/Association 1 1 1
Mixed Allocation 3 3 3
Other 2 2 1
Not Specified 1 7 7
Total of above 1261 1278 1370
Total of TRQ in Schedules 1370 1370 1370
Source: calculated from WTO notifications
As far as fill rates are concerned, the highest average for 1995-97 appears in the case of auction
(89 percent), state-trading (82 percent) and ￿ on a more reliable base ￿ applied tariffs (79 percent,
table 10). On the contrary, licenses on demand (55 percent), first-come first-served (52 percent) and
historical importers (35 percent ￿ on a less representative way in these two last cases ￿ result the
poorest average fill rates.
The particularly high rate of fill of the applied tariffs method (under which the within TRQ
tariff rate is extended to all exports), can be justified by the fact that this arrangement is equivalent to
a tariff-only system at the within TRQ rate. On the contrary, cost of obtaining licences and of
complying with licenses conditions may have resulted in higher levels of protection. Non reallocation
of licenses ￿ when not fulfilled by importers ￿ may also have played an important role.12
In the case of first-come first-served, uncertainties about conditions within this category ￿
especially when imports approach the TRQ total quantity ￿ as well as differences in seasonality
between importing and exporting countries can have discouraged importers and exporters of the TRQ
products. As far as historical importers is concerned, low fill rates may be associated to a possible
absence of reallocation of TRQ unfilled shares ￿ in particular when individual supplying countries
are attributed specific allocations.
Box 1: TRQs Allocation Methods: Definition and Characteristics
Applied Tariffs  Import quantities are not restricted and no right to import or export are issued.
Imports are solely determined by the first-tier tariff. Under this definition, only the within tariff-quota
tariff applies. The difference with having a bound tariff at the within tariff-quota tariff is that the
importing country can, if necessary, increase the tariff up to the above tariff-quota tariff. Except in the
case of prohibitive within tariff-quota tariff, this system results in a larger import access for the
product. It also avoids inefficiencies in quota allocation.
First-Come First-Served  Import quantities are restricted but no share is allocated to importers.
Imports are allowed at the in-quota tariff rate until the TRQ is filled. Then the higher tariff
automatically applies. In spite of being open to all importers  ￿ and therefore less subject to
inefficiencies in quota allocation ￿ this system reveals several disadvantages. The first one is to
destabilise trade through concentrating imports at the beginning of the import season. This might
happen in the case of large importing countries ￿ in particular if several have similar marketing
years. This can be all the most damaging ￿ specifically for exporting countries which seasonality is
out of phase with the tariff quota imports. But importing countries may suffer higher importing prices
and higher storage costs than otherwise. In addition, if the timing of import coincides with the
domestic off season, this will not encourage competition for domestic producers. Moreover, the way
of reducing this problem ￿ which consist in dividing the tariff-quota into tranches (Podbury and
Roberts, 1999) ￿ can reproduce it at different periods of the year and still introduce unnecessary
rigidities.
Another problem of this system can be seen in the market power acquired by the importer(s) or
exporter(s) in the case of a very limited number of traders involved in the share of the tariff-quota.
This asks also the question of the appropriation of the rent ￿ which reflects the difference between
the internal supported price and the world price plus the within tariff-quota ￿ one particularity of
tariff-quotas being to allow for market rents to be extracted. In fact, the particular groups that may
obtain the rent depend on the TRQ administration method, the degree of market competition and the
market power of importers or exporters.
Finally, in addition to the monitoring cost for the importing country (in order to get information on the
changeover from charging the within tariff-quota), the increasing tariff uncertainties when the within
tariff-quota is about to be reached can discourage imports, or result in delays to delivery that can
affect various parties in the supply chain.
Licenses on demand. Import quantities are restricted and shares are allocated to importers through
imports authorisations. Import licenses are generally issued before physical imports occur and in
relation to quantities demanded within the country. This includes methods where licenses are issued
on a first-come first-served basis or are proportionally reduced when exceeding total TRQ. This
allocation process can require security deposits, or use, or use-it-or-lose-it policies associated.
Despite reproducing some of the handicaps of the first-come first-served system (such as
administrative costs or, if not regimented, the excessive power market of a limited number of traders,
Podbury and Roberts, 1999), allocation of licenses provides a greater degree of certainty to importers
on the tariffs and conditions of entry. It may also overcome the problem of seasonality.
However, some problems may arise from the way of administrating allocation. Information on who
holds licenses and on the timing of distribution is not always available in advance to exporting13
countries. Period of validity can place pressure on the importing firm. Reallocation of licenses may
not be allowed between traders. Allocation can be subject to arbitrary changes or can authorise
governments to manipulate competitive forces.
Historical Importers Shares are allocated to importers (or imports licenses are issued) in relation to
past imports of the product. Although maintaining established trading relationships, this system
discourages new traders. In particular, a rigidity of the system lays in the appropriation of the rent by
the historical importers ￿ or historical exporters if they have specific quantities allocated to them by
historical importers ￿ which can lead to significant administrative and rent seeking costs. As far as
minimum access is concerned, it can be seen as being in contradiction with Article XIII of the GATT.
In addition ￿ similarly to the first-come first-served system ￿ if tariff-quota is allocated to high cost
supplying countries, internal prices may be maintained well above world prices (which in turn may
result in being more depressed). Some of the supplying countries may even not be able to obtain rents
because of their high costs.
Auctioning. Importers’ shares or imports licenses are based on a competitive bid system. Number and
timing of auctions are held at the discretion of the importing country. The advantage of this system
lays on the fact that it minimises the trade distortions that may occur under the TRQ scheme (Josling,
Tangermann and Warley, 1996). It ensure, in addition, that a substantial component of the market rent
is appropriated by the government of the importing country. This represent a major argument (equity)
in favour of auctioning, since quota rent will benefit to all citizens rather than to specific private ones.
The principle involved is that competition between bidders will increase the auction price to the point
that the return obtainable is just sufficient to provide a margin for risk over the normal level of profit.
Another argument is transparency. Auctioning reveals to all parties the degree of protection attached
to the quota. Finally, auctioning can promote quota fill, since it is likely that any importer who invest
in a license will actually import.
Some limits of the system can been seen, however, in the additional costs imposed on potential
importers to obtain information and participate in the auction ￿ specially when the volumes available
within the tariff-quotas are small. This situation ￿ which increases import charges beyond those
committed by the countries  ￿ questions also the legal status of the system regarding the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture. Other potential problems ￿ such as a monopolisation of the market by
trading companies, producer or consumer groups, the importing country or exporting firms ￿ can
also be of concern.
Lottery. Importers’ shares or imports licenses are based on a lottery system. Such as auctioning, this
system minimises the trade distortions that may occur under allocation of licenses. In addition, it
avoids the supplementary costs associated to auctioning, as well as the potential monopolisation of the
market. Inefficiencies can however arise if, once the right to import is given, it cannot be transferred.
Identically, if speculators who are not importers acquire the licenses, this can give rise to a secondary
market of import licenses which can generate uncertainty. Unless there is penalty for non
performance, there is a danger that imports do no occur if speculators do not succeed in selling their
licenses.
Imports by State Trading Enterprises (STEs) Importers’ shares are partially or entirely allocated to a
state trading entity which imports or controls the import of the product. STEs are generally considered
by governments as instruments to manage domestic markets. In particular, they can stabilise these
markets in face of low import prices. However, they can also be used to restrict imports in the case of
political pressures or to protect rent seeking activities. STEs can also be seen as a convenient way of
ensuring that market rents are appropriated by the government of the importing country, which
revenue can be used for public objectives.
Producer Groups or Associations. Importers’ shares are partially or entirely allocated to a producer
group or association which imports or controls the import of the product. An important issue
regarding this system is the one of the tradeoffs between the benefits that the producer groups or
associations can obtain through importing, and the benefits that their members can obtain through14
restricting imports. This can result in a potential for highly unstable imports within tariff-quotas, as
well as the formation of cartels restricting trade further and capturing more rents.
Finally, the good performances of the State Trading Enterprises (STEs) in allocating TRQs
have to be highlighted. This result may be mainly due to the high control that these entities can have
on the quantities imported. On the opposite, costs associated to the auctioning system should have
more discouraged importers than the observation lets appear. Note, however, that the small number of
observations for these two categories weakens our results.
Table 10. TRQs Simple Average Fill Rates by Allocation Method
(in %) 1995 1996 1997 Average
Applied Tariffs 72 66 100 79
License on Demand 55 63 47 55
First-Come First-Served 57 55 44 52
Historical Importers 32 38 na 35
Auction 91 81 94 89
State-Trading 81 83 na 82
Producer Groups/Associations 74 53 na 64
Source: calculated from WTO notifications
TRQs Additional Conditions
In many instances, other conditions (see Box 2 for definition) apply to TRQs arrangements. In
1996, 15 of the 36 WTO members which had applied TRQs reported in 236 cases using additional
conditions (corresponding to 18 percent of total TRQs), most of them been applied in Europe
13. Most
frequent additional conditions are limits on tariff-quota shares per allocation, past trading
performances and ￿ to a lesser extent ￿ domestic purchase requirements and provision of export
certificates (table 11).
Table 11. TRQs Additional Conditions with Allocation Methods
(number of TRQs) 1995 1996 1997 Average
Domestic Purchase Requirement 46 46 46 46
Limits on TRQ Shares 102 111 118 110
Export Certificates 25 25 25 25
Past Trading Performance 71 71 70 71
Past Trading Performance 3 3 3 3
+ Limits on TRQ Shares
Source: calculated from WTO notifications
These conditions participate in some of the low fill rates observed. They even can become the
primary determinant of TRQs imports. WTO (1997) analyses some complementarity between TRQs
administration methods and additional conditions that can explain some differences in tariff-quota fill
rates. Relative lower fill rates seem to be associated to limits in tariff-quota shares when combined
with licenses on demand or auctioning. This can be explained by the supplementary costs associated
to these two forms of allocation, this cost discouraging imports when the tariff-quota shares are too
small. This does not concern applied tariffs and first-come first-served, which association with limits
in tariff- quota shares performs larger fill rates. As far as other additional conditions are concerned,
domestic purchase requirements, as well as export certificates (which are less frequently used) do not
seem to have particularly discouraged imports, contrary to past trading performances which
association with limits in tariff-quota shares perform particularly bad in term of rate of fill.
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Box 2: Additional Conditions Attached to TRQs Administration Methods
Domestic Purchase Requirement. A certain obligation of purchase or absorption of domestic
production of the product  concerned is required in order to be eligible to secure a share of the tariff-
quota. This condition, by increasing the price of the domestically produced good concerned, extends
the demand for imports within the tariff-quota, but hinder efficient resources allocation. Similarly,
consumption being reduced, the final level of trade and import is lower than if the market were
liberalised. Local content schemes can, in addition, be subject to frequent changes depending on the
level of domestic production and consumption or on political pressures.
Limits in Tariff-quota Shares per Allocation. A maximum share or quantity of the tariff-quota is
specified for each importer or shipment. The interest of this additional condition is to limit the market
power acquired by the importer(s) or exporter(s) in the case of a very limited number of traders
involved in the share of the tariff-quota. On the opposite, if shares are too small, this can discourage
imports, specially when the allocation process is costly (like in the case of licenses on demand or
auctions).
Export Certificates. An export certificate or a license issued by the exporting country is required as
an additional  criteria of the eligibility. This additional condition gives to the importing country a
supplementary insurance that the contract will be respected and the tariff-quota filled. It constitutes,
however, an additional cost.
Past Trading Performances. Although allocation is not made in proportion to past-trade share, the
existence of past trading is required to be eligible to secure a share of the tariff-quota. Neither this
condition constitutes a mean of maintaining established trading relationship, it deters “new” trade.
Administration of TRQs: Countries Experiences
As far as countries are concerned, the EU notifies separately to the WTO its commitments in
terms of current and minimum access (respectively 44 and 35 TRQs), along with the administration
method and the tariff applied. Current access concerns essentially milk products and fruits and
vegetables, and minimum access meat products. Current access commitments ￿ which are issued of
previous contracts
14 ￿ are administered on a country basis. Minimum access commitments ￿ which
administration follows the MNF principal ￿ do not include a list of countries. However for 18 TRQs
(concerning  pigmeat and poultry meat, eggs and milk products), the EU specifies that minimum
access can be filled through existing accords. In addition, European notifications of TRQs relate to
the quantities committed but not to the quantities really imported. These two points have been
criticised by several countries.
The EU has used three different allocation methods: licenses on demand (for most TRQs),
historical importers and first-come first-served (no license being issued in this last case). Licenses are
granted only to importing companies which have been registered in the EU. In this way, the EU has
abstained from allocating quotas to groups directly related to producer interests. Pro-rata reductions
are used if applications exceed availability. For fruits and vegetables, licenses are not issued. Instead
tariff reductions are reimbursed ex-post if it turns out that quota were not filled at the time of
importation (the banana regime is very specific and will not be discussed here).
In the case of historical importers (durum wheat, banana, butter, poultry, turkey, meat of
swine), a small part of the TRQs is reserved to new entrants (8 percent for example in the case of
banana). Exporters do not get access to quotas, except in a few cases of country specific TRQs.
Export licenses are required for casava and rice, but only for Indonesia, Thailand and Australia. This
situation ￿ which is contrary to the MFN principle ￿ could be questioned by these countries.
                                                          
14 These contracts concern East Europe, ACP countries, Australia, Canada, Chile, Groenland, India, Indonesia,
Island, New Zealand, Thailand, Uruguay, and the US.16
Additional conditions are generally associated to the allocation process. These conditions go
from registration of enterprises on VAT lists, obligation of processing of the imported product,
certificates of origin (raw cane sugar, bovine meat), or past-trading performances (brown rice, various
cereals, raw cane sugar, eggs, poultry meat). The length of validity of the licenses is also generally
limited in time. This is true for 59 TRQs on a total of 85. This length of validity ￿ which varies
greatly with the products ￿ can be very constraining. This is the case for example of wheat (5 days),
durum wheat (7 days) and sugar (1 month). The conformity of this point with the article 3 (5g) of the
URAA could be of some concern.
As far as fill rates are concerned, minimum access commitments are slightly better filled than
current access commitments (on average 74 percent against 69 percent for 1995-97 period). Finally
under many TRQs, quota rents accruing to traders seem to be significant.
In Canada ￿ like the import quotas they replaced ￿ most TRQs are administered on a global
quota basis (16 on 21). However, a number of partial country allocation was maintained or
established. This has been the case of EU for most cheese, of New Zealand for most butter, of
Australia for all condensed milk and cream, and of New Zealand and Australia for most bovine meat.
These TRQs must be part of the current access commitments, although no distinction can be made in
the Canada’s notifications between current and minimum access commitments.
In most of the other cases, allocation follows the first-come first-served and historical importers
approaches
15. Most TRQs allocations are valid for a 12 month period, with import permits issued for a
length of 30 days. In fact, administration of TRQs has constituted the most controversial issue of
URAA implementation for Canada. The arrangements have been developed through extensive
consultations with industry groups and have varied across commodities and over time. The underlying
principles have been to keep the rent inside the country (through domestic importers), as well as to
provide for transferability of import rights and for flexibility in the light of past experience.
Underfilled TRQs correspond to two types of commodities. The first one is includes products
whose domestic price is very low (wheat and barley in particular). The second one must have faced
administrative barriers (dairy products enter this category). However, for commodities which are
characterised by high fill rates, market access does not seam to have neither improved. This is the
case of dairy products, which volume commitments have been under estimated through specific
calculation methods. But more generally, most of TRQs imports have been made through NAFTA
arrangements.
Among the 54 TRQs notified by the US to the WTO, no distinction is made between current
and minimum access commitments. For most of TRQs, one part is allocated to domestic importers,
and the other part to specific export countries. In this case ￿ which should correspond to existing
contracts extended to the current access commitments  ￿ the list of countries and the quantities
concerned are part of the US schedule. As far as domestic importers and minimum access
commitments are concerned, administration of TRQs is made on the basis of licenses on demand
(sometimes associated to lottery in the case of butter oil and cheese for example), as well as of first-
come first served (tariff-quotas fill rates being rather low in this case).
Another anomaly concerns the rather low (or  non existent) part of TRQs allocated to domestic
importers when the allocation is also associated to export countries. This questions the reality of the
minimum access commitments or the respect of the MFN principle (although no verification can be
done). Moreover, in this case, most TRQs perform low fill rates. This can be due to earlier non
performing contracts attached to the current access commitments, as well as to the non-reallocation of
the countries shares (although permitted) when not filled
                                                          
15 The first-come first-served method is used for cereals. In the case of condensed and concentrated milk, as well
as powdered butter milk, one historical importer has the exclusive right to in-quota imports. For butter, the
Canadian Dairy Commission has the monopoly of imports.17
For Japan also, no distinction is made between current and minimum access. Moreover, no
countries list is added to the schedule ￿ allocation being made on a global basis. This does not allow
to verify each commitment separately. Two ways of administration of the tariff-quotas are used in
Japan. One part of TRQs is attributed directly to domestic importers through licenses generally to
traditional importers or to producer groups. This is the case of earlier import quotas of weak domestic
consumption products, as well as of tariff-quotas related to sensible products
16. In this last case,
additional conditions ￿ such as limits in tariff-quota shares or non reallocation of licenses ￿ are
attached to the acquisition of licenses. All these conditions (low domestic demand, traditional
importers, producer groups and additional conditions) explain the low rates of fill perform for these
categories of TRQs.
Table 12 : Tariff-Rate Quotas by Allocation Methods (1995-97)
Canada EU Japan US
Nb TRQs
lines
Fill Rate Nb TRQs
lines
Fill Rate Nb TRQs
lines
Fill Rate Nb TRQs
lines
Fill Rate
Applied tariff 1 100
License on
 Demand
6 71 39 67 13 59
First-Come
 First-Served
4 54 15 71 21 45
Historical
 Importers
6 96 4 90
Auction
State-Trading 1 100 4 100
Source: OECD (1999b)
Another part of TRQs is attributed to state enterprises
17. Such enterprises import the product
concerned and resell it to domestic importers under some conditions (such as past trading
performances for example). This generally applies to TRQs which procure new access opportunities
18.
These tariff-quotas are on average correctly filled (more than 85 and even 95 percent).
The case of rice has been particular in Japan, this product having been exempted from
tariffication under the “Special Treatment” (ST) provisions. However from April 1999, Japanese
government decided to return to the tariffication and to exit the TRQs system.
TRQs Tariff rates
By some aspects, such as the modalities of administration, TRQs maintain some non tariff
obstacles to trade. This also happens when the beyond tariff-quota tariff is high enough to prohibit
trade ￿ the TRQ being assimilated to an import quota in this case. In fact, another outcome of TRQs
is the one of above-quota ( OTRQs) tariffs, which remain often prohibitive or too high to allow
imports to compete.
This concerns in particular Canada and Japan (which OTRQs tariff rates of respectively 203
and 274 percent exceed by far WTO average), the US and the EU applying much more reasonable
rates (respectively 29 and 45 percent, table 13). In fact, this situation affects specific commodities.
This is the case of sugar and some dairy products in the US, the EU and Japan, of wheat products
 in
                                                          
16 Various dairy products, oils and fats, pulses, starches, and silk cocoons enter these two categories.
17 Three of them share the imports of TRQs : ALIC (Agriculture and Livestock Industry Corporation), the Office
for Raw Silk and Sugar Price Stabilisation, and the Office of Control of Food Products.
18 These TRQs concern essentially cereals and cereals products (wheat, barley, rice).18
Canada, the EU
19 and Japan, of eggs, poultry meat and some dairy products in Canada, of beef and
fruits and vegetables in the EU, and of pigmeat meat in Japan (table A9 in annex).
In-quota (ITRQs) tariffs have, in some cases, been found little or not different from those
resulting from the tariffication (table 13 and table A9 in Annex). Although URAA does not give any
precise definition of the within-tariff rates, these must be less than the gap between the domestic and
world price to generate the full quota volume. Precise assessment of countries experiences is difficult.
Table 13. Average Tariffs and TRQs Tariffs in Agriculture
(in %)   Agriculture ITRQs OTRQs All Products
Canada 5 8 203 5
EU 20 8 45 7
Japan 12 20 274 5
US 6 10 29 4
OECD 36 36 120 15
non-OECD 63 59 125 43
Source: OECD (1999a)
As far as the EU is concerned, within tariff-quotas tariffs seem to have been generally set at
less than 20 percent of beyond tariff-quotas tariffs. Similarly, in Japan these rates are a little
proportion of the bound tariffs issued from the tariffication process (a maximum tariff of 35 percent is
reported for butter). In the US, within tariff rates do not seem neither excessive and not a cause of low
fill rates
20. In the case of Canada, imports within quota pay the duty applicable depending of the
country of origin. This may be the MFN tariff (that has been cut of 57 percent following URAA
commitments in terms of tariffs reduction)
21 or preferential tariff applicable to imports from the US,
Mexico, Israel, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and from countries benefiting from the GSP
(Generalised System of Preferences)
22. This makes the in tariff-quotas tariff rates particularly low
(specially compared to the beyond one. Excessive in-TRQs tariff rates are the ones of butter in
Canada and the EU (respectively 144 and 77 percent), as well as of sugar in the US (44 percent, table
A9 in Annex).
III.1.4- Special Safeguard Provisions
One consideration regarding the Special Safeguard Provisions (SSP) was their possible
reduction of the trade impact of  tariffication ( Tangermann, 1995). In addition, by enabling the
importing countries to increase their levels of protection, the safeguards intensify the depressed world
market situation. These provisions have however been fundamental in the approval of the market
access measures by the most protectionist importing countries. In practice, tariffs being set at a high
level, SSP have not been used to the extend many commentators predicted. From 1995 to 1997, they
                                                          
19 In the case of cereals, another reason of low fill rates (in addition of the general question of TRQs
administration) can be seen in the CAP changes which have led to a cut in cereals prices and in cereal substituted
demand. Consequently, imports of manioc and cereal residues have fallen significantly short of the quota which
have been negotiated with Thailand and other exporters.
20 Recall that a substantial part of TRQs is filled through the NAFTA or through other preferential agreements at
a zero or low tariff rate.
21 Canada has chosen to apply the URAA average tariff cut of 36 percent in a way that gives more protection to
its tariffied products. This has led to the minimum cut of 15 percent of over-quota tariffs, while in-quota tariffs
were reduced of 57 percent.
22 Since 1979 Tokyo Round, GSP preferential scheme has offered to developing countries access to developed
countries market through zero tariffs or lower tariff rates on certain products and quota allocation.19
have only been utilised by 6 Members, mainly Japan, the US, and the EU to a lesser extent
(particularly in the case of sugar, Carson, 1998). In addition, except in the case of pigmeat in Japan,
SSP have not been a source of controversies. They have generally touched products where minimum
quantities imports (TRQs) were taking place.
In OECD countries, volume-based safeguard was invoked on 130 tariff lines over 1995-98
period. Japan has applied it the most frequently in 1996 (61 lines), as well as the EU (47 lines, table
14b). Price-based safeguards were however used more widely (for 199 lines), specially by the US (in
146 cases from 1995 to 1997, table 14a). The price-based safeguard was more widespread in dairy,
sugar, coffee, tea and cocoa, while the volume-based one was used mainly on fruits and vegetables
and meats (OECD, 1999b). In the EU, price-based safeguard has only been implemented in three
sectors (sugar, poultry and molasses), while volume-based safeguard was only used in 1996 and in
one sector (fruits and vegetables).
Three main issues seem however of some concern. First, it appears that in a number of case, the
additional duty has been imposed on very small quantities. This has been the case for example in the
US for some cheese and in Japan for some milk products. But more importantly, the trigger prices
countries apply in the price-based safeguard are, in many cases, higher than the external reference
prices used to calculate tariff equivalents. In fact, if URAA do not commit countries to define SSP
trigger prices, it stipulates than this one should be the 1996-88 average cif unit value of the product
concerned (in domestic currency). Finally, the level of commodity aggregation for application of the
SSP is generally broader from that used for tariffication.
In addition, several complains relate to the extensive use of SSP by Japan. Various products
have been concerned ￿ such as pigmeat, starch and some dairy products ￿ for which the trigger
volume levels are very low. The question addressed to Japan has been the one of calculation of these
levels. In fact, calculations have most of the time been done at an aggregated level, the allocation to
the individual commodities being made in a second time in a more arbitrary way. In addition to the
lack of transparency of the system, the low level of fill rates of the corresponding TRQs has also been
highlighted by several countries.
Table 14a. Price-Based Special Agricultural Safeguard
(number items) 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
EU 12 13 26
Japan 3 1 4
US 24 49 73 146
Total OECD 42 71 83 3 199
Table 14b. Volume-Based Special Agricultural Safeguard
(number items) 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
EU 47 47
Japan 5 61 5 2 73
US 6 6
Total OECD 5 108 8 9 130
Source: OECD (1999b)
The very specific Japanese safeguard system for  pigmeat has also to be explained. As
emergency protection measures against rapid increase in pigmeat imports, two types of safeguard
system can be used in Japan. One is the domestic Japanese safeguard system (sanctioned by the
WTO), the other one is the URAA SSP. The increase in pigmeat imports triggered safeguard measure
under the Japanese safeguard regime in four of nine quarters between 1995 and 1997, and the WTO
SSP was invoked in one quarter. Although the legality of the Japanese regime cannot really be
questioned, it has been criticised by  pigmeat exporting countries like Canada and the EU. The20




Limitation of export subsidies constituted the most controversial issue of the negotiations,
being the one which could have the most immediate impact on markets and trade. The choice of the
reference period has allowed the US (for wheat, rice, vegetable oil, and eggs), the EU (for wheat,
cheese, poultry meat, beef and tobacco), Australia (for dairy products) and Canada (for wheat and
butter) to base their commitments on large quantities of exports (see table A10 in Annex). Hence, in
spite of the globally significant fall of subsidised exports, the quantities authorised is still disruptive
in the short-medium term to international trade for some important products.
The consequences of the Agreement remain, however, potentially important for a certain
number of reasons. Firstly, the introduction of new export subsidies has been prohibited. Secondly
commitments are, in one way, more strict than the market access ones, in the sense that the Agreement
includes an exhaustive list of products concerned. This limits the capacity of the countries to restrain
the impact of their commitments by aggregation of commodities and concentration of actions on the
less sensitive ones. Thirdly, the adoption of a double discipline on value and volume constitutes
another strength, trade growth in particular reducing automatically in the long run the overall
significance of subsidies. Finally, the commitment of the countries to work on other questions such as
export credits, food aid and export restrictions represents a positive point for the future.
Globally, 32 countries have been affected by the reduction of export subsidies. The impact of
commitments differs according to the magnitude and the frequency of the subsidies used. The
countries which have been the most affected are the EU for a wide range of products (wheat, cheese,
beef, pigmeat, poultry, fresh fruits and vegetables, olive oil) and the US (specially for wheat, dairy
products and some meat products, table A10 in Annex). Canada was principally concerned for milk
and cereals transport costs. Norway, Poland, Hungary, Israel and South Africa have also been
involved to different degrees.
The impact of commitments has also been limited in the short term, by the high level of
agricultural prices at the beginning of the implementation period (table 15). For cereals, the use of
subsidies fell dramatically in 1995-96, with around one quarter of the quantities permitted reported for
this period. Subsidised quantities of dairy products were in 1995 between 35 percent (for butter) and
80 percent (for cheese and other milk products) of the maximum level allowed, with quasi no
subsidies in 1996. Meat products registered in 1995 around 60 percent of the maximum authorised
and also no subsidies in 1996. Consequently, only five countries exceeded one or more of their
commitments in 1995 and three did in 1996
23.
Prices having returned during 1997 to level more consistent with long term trends, a number of
countries reached their permitted subsidies limits for certain commodities. In some cases, unused
subsidies allowances from previous years were used to subsidise exports in excess. This was the case
for the European beef exports, which reach their limit in volume. The EU also reached its limits for
subsidised exports of cheese. Export subsidies had to be reintroduced for grains. In the US, no export
subsidies were paid for crops, but those for dairy products increased sharply. The fall of world prices
in 1998 let think that the constraint on exports was also more active last year.
Grains still represented the largest volume of subsidised exports (although they were far below
commitments, especially in 1995). Fruits and vegetables, other milk products, beef and sugar account
for most of remaining subsidised exports (table 15). In fact these commodities, along with oilseeds
                                                          
23 Cyprus, Hungary, Norway, Switzerland and South Africa in 1995, and the EU, Poland and South Africa in
1996.21
and vegetable oils, have been allotted the largest permitted quantities. In term of volume, those that
have been closed to fill their commitments are other milk products, cheese and bovine meat.
The possibility to utilise the non-used quota of export subsidies has been criticised by several
countries (among which the ones of the Cairn group
24). The Canada’s new dairy regime consistency
with the WTO rules on export subsidies has also been questioned. Another controversy has
surrounded the use by the EU of the “Inward Processing Relief” (IRP) system to subsidise more
quantities of cheese than agreed. In these two cases, Canada and the EU have been accused by their
trading partners to circumvent their export subsidy commitments
25.
Table 15 : WTO Export Subsidy Commitments and Outcomes
1995 1996
(in 1000 tons) Commitments Realised Share Used
(%)
Commitments Realised Share Used (%)
Wheat 59452 4 350 7 42 820 14 110 26
Coarse Grains 2 856 7 666 27 19 213 11 845 34
Rice 784 99 13 726 227 19
Oilseeds 2 799 5 0 638 4 0
Vegetable Oils 2 000 202 10 1 765 140 -2
Oilcakes 360 0 0 74 0 0
Sugar 6 085 897 15 4 443 1 373 16
Butter and Butter Oil 631 155 35 584 287 24
Skim Milk Powder 754 399 53 666 359 1
Cheese 555 447 81 515 425 2
Other Milk Products 1 538 1 267 82 1 437 1 248 4
Bovine Meat 1 561 1 020 65 1 486 1 178 14
Pigmeat 79 380 56 655 296 -11
Poultrymeat 784 463 58 755 414 -3
Sheepmeat 29 1 4 38 1 -3
Live Animals 171 59 34 165 66 6
Eggs 30 97 75 125 70 -19
Wine 842 297 35 82 470 23
Fruits and Vegetables 7 258 1 594 22 6 646 1 894 7
Tobacco 268 16 6 250 4 -4
Cotton 55 0 0 54 0 0
Total 114 900 19 414 17 83 876 34 712 24
Source: WTO Secretariat, based on Notifications as of November 1997
III.2.2. Medium Term Impact
In the medium term, assessment of the impact of the export subsidy commitments must be
related to supply, demand and prices adjustment resulting from the policy changes. One question is, in
particular, whether the evolution of world prices and of national policies will allow exporters who
normally resort to subsidies to export without them.
The international wheat market has always been subject to great tensions, because of the
extended use by exporters of subventions in order to maintain or increase their market share.
                                                          
24 This group is composed of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chilli, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay.
25 Canada established a two-tier price system for milk, that prices milk cheaper to processors when used in the
exports manufactured dairy than when used domestically (this system laying on producer levies). As far as the
EU is concerned, processed cheese issued from an amalgamation of butter, skim milk powder and natural cheese
has been subsidised through the subsidies of the three component products.22
Limitations of these practices will result in an improvement in the functioning of world market, as
well as in a rise in the world price (probably accentuated by an augmentation in the world demand).
The US has already benefited from the situation in increasing their production, as well as their market
share. This will, in turn, temperate the rise in world prices, as already noticed in 1997 and 1998.
Limitations in export subsidies will, however, require reorienting production towards domestic
markets. Nevertheless in the future ￿ due to the important policy changes through the FAIR Act
(Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act ) ￿ the US will not have difficulties in meeting
its commitments
26. Similarly in Canada, policy adjustments make it possible to fulfil export subsidy
commitments without a decrease in production.
As far as the EU is concerned ￿ through the Agenda 2000 Agriculture Reform (see Box 3) ￿
wheat exporters will also be in the future in a better position to meet their URAA commitments.
Despite the 1992 CAP reform ￿ which led to a 30 percent drop in domestic wheat price ￿ the
continuation of the set aside program and the possible increase of the world price, the EU would have
faced an important growth of its stocks in cereals (72.3 millions of tons in 2005 according to EU
Commission's evaluations) which would have questioned the export subsidies reduction. The further
cut of 15 percent of the intervention prices and the continuation of the compulsory set-aside program
is expected to decrease further the supply of cereals, as well as to increase the domestic demand and
the competition on world markets.
Improvements in the functioning of dairy market are also expected in the medium term. World
prices of butter, skim milk powder and cheese should be rising in response to the slow down of
production, allowing Australia, Canada and the US to satisfy their export subsidy constraints through
relatively minor policy changes. Structural shifts in production and consumption in the field of butter
and milk powder following Agenda 2000 reform should also permit the EU to fulfil its commitments.
Some difficulties may, however, remain for cheese products.
The EU was the only subsidised exporter of beef, and was particularly hit by the export
subsidies discipline in this sector. In fact, the structural slow down in domestic demand and the
absence of an increase in the world price ￿ which could have led to a rise in European stocks up to
1.464 millions of tons in 2005  ￿ made it urgent to consider further policy adjustments. The
implementation of the cut of 20 percent in the intervention prices through the new CAP reform will in
this context help the EU to respect its commitments.
Limitations on subsidised exports of pig meat and poultry meat also affect almost exclusively
the EU ￿ and to a lesser extent poultry in the US. As far as the EU is concerned, the new CAP
reform which further reduces input costs through feed-grain price, will help in meeting URAA
requirements. Specific policy changes might, however, be necessary in the mid term in response to the
export subsidy constraints.
Similarly, the EU could experience difficulties in meeting its export subsidies commitments in
some other areas not taken into consideration by the Agenda 2000 Agriculture Reform. This may be
the case of rice, sugar, fruits and vegetables, wine and to a lesser extend olive oil ￿ which export
subsidies expenditures in 1995 and 1996 are far above the final bound rate in 2000/01 (table 16). This
issue might be of some concern during the new Round of Negotiations if further cuts in exports
subsidies are decided.
Box 3: The EU Agriculture Agenda 2000 Reform
Ministers of Agriculture reached an agreement on the Agenda 2000 for agriculture in March 1999.
The Agreement includes the following arrangements:
                                                          
26 Although the 1996 FAIR Act continues authorisation for export subsidies, the US no longer maintains high
support prices and no longer requires farmers to idle croplands. Therefore the US exports are now in a better
position to compete on world markets without export subsidies.23
Arable Crops. The reduction of the intervention prices by 15 percent in two equals steps in the
marketing years 2000/2001 and 2001/2002. The establishment of a non crop-specific payment to
compensate half of the prices reduction. Compulsory set-aside program at a rate of 10 percent on the
period 2000/2006.
Bovine Meat. The reduction of the intervention prices by 20 percent in 3 equal steps starting on 1 July
2000, along with the development of a safety net. The endowment of a premium to compensate 85
percent of the prices cut and the creation of a special premium for suckler cows.
Dairy Products. The maintaining of the milk quotas until 2006. The reduction of the intervention
prices for butter and skimmed milk powder of 15 percent from 2005/2006. The development of new
premiums based upon quota levels.
Table 16. UE Export Subsidies in base period, 1995, 1996 and 2000 bound Rates
(millions of ECU) Base 1995 1996 2000 Bound Rates 1996/Bound Rates
Wheat 2 015 119 318 1 290 0.25
Coarse Grains 1 636 303 389 1 047 0.37
Rice 58 30 72 37 1.96
Oilseeds 43 0 0 28 0
Olive Oil 85 62 39 54 0.72
Sugar 780 379 525 499 1.05
Butter and Butter Oil 1 481 256 552 948 0.58
Skim Milk Powder 431 141 170 275 0.62
Cheese 53 438 271 342 0.79
Other Milk Products 1 090 728 732 698 1.05
Bovine Meat 1 958 1 507 1 527 1 254 1.22
Pigmeat 299 101 71 191 0.37
Poultrymeat 142 116 73 91 0.8
Eggs 68 13 7 44 0.16
Wine 61 51 60 39 1.52
Fruits and Vegetables 9 82 72 61 1.18
Tobacco 63 18 3 40 0.08
Incorporated Products 448 491 566 413 1.37
Other Agricultural Products 150 51 119 96 1.23
Total Export Subsidies 11 438 4 885 5 565 7 746 0.72
Source: From WTO data, based on Notifications as of November 1997
III.2.3.- State Trading Enterprises (STEs): Market Access and Export Competition
STEs continue to be important to the trade of staple agricultural commodities because many
countries consider them an appropriate mean to meet domestic agricultural policy objectives, such as
price support to farmers, economies of scale or food security (WTO, 1995c, see Box 4 for definition).
STEs operate in a wide range of agricultural products, but have been more active in grain and dairy
commodities (butter and milk powder, USDA, 1997).
From 1994 to 1997, 33 percent of wheat exports were handled by two large  STEs (the
Australian and Canadian Wheat Boards). The two other large wheat exporters (the US and the EU)
maintain government institutions that subsidise private traders’ exports. STEs are also present in
Central European countries. For the same period of time, STEs imports accounted between one-third
and one-half of wheat imports, among which China, Japan, Egypt and Pakistan are well represented.
Countries such as Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, South Korea, Morocco, the Philippines an Algeria have
however recently open their sector to the private enterprises. STEs account for about half of world
rice exports (mainly in Vietnam, Australia and China) and nearly one third of imports (among which
in Indonesia, the Philippines, China, Japan, South and North Korea and Malaysia).24
As far as dairy products are concerned, the New Zealand Dairy Board handled around 30
percent of world exports in 1997. Australian, Canadian and Polish STEs being also well represented
in the market. The Mexican Conasupo used to dominate imports of milk products with 35 percent of
world imports (this sector being presently privatising).
Although there are no provisions in the URAA relating to  STEs, several countries have
highlighted the excessive market power of these entities. In fact ￿ regardless the fact that STEs do
not seem to have constituted an obstacle to TRQs fill rates ￿ these bodies retain the ability of
restricting the volume of imports. In particular, when purchase decision are based on political rather
than commercial criteria, they may leave domestic demand unsatisfied (Ackerman, 1997). The lack of
transparency in pricing and operational activities of  STEs has also led some WTO members to
express concern about possible use of  STEs to circumvent URAA commitments  ￿ specially on
market access and exports subsidies. It is also argued that statutory authorities provide STEs with
opportunities unavailable to commercial firms that compete against them (Dixit and Josling, 1997 ;
Ackerman, Dixit and Simone, 1997).
Box 4: State Trading Enterprises (STEs) and International Trade
The 1947 GATT, while acknowledging  STEs as legitimate participants in international trade,
established guidelines for their trading activities. Among these, GATT article XVII requires that STEs
not discriminate among importers or exporters when they purchase or sale, and that they act “in
accordance with commercial considerations”. Countries must report information about their STEs to
the GATT (the WTO now). While recognising that STEs might create trade barriers, the GATT
advocates countries to negotiate to reduce obstacles to trade created by STEs.
Following URAA, the WTO defined  STEs as “governmental and  nongovernmental enterprise  ￿
including marketing boards ￿ which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges ￿
including statutory or constitutional powers  ￿ in the exercise of which they influence through
purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports”. URAA also established stronger
notifications requirement, as well as a working party under the Council of Trade in Goods to review
the countries’ notifications.
III.2.4. Other Export Commitments
In addition to the practices of single-desk selling agencies which have been questioned by
several countries, utilisation of export taxes and export restraints through quantitative control have
neither been properly addressed. This happened in recent years, when world prices of grains rose to
relatively high levels, these practices being used in order to limit the outflow of grains and to prevent
domestic prices from rising to world market levels. Similarly, the use of export credits has continued,
despite efforts to negotiate within the OECD some restraints on the benefits that some exporters get
from such schemes. This has been particularly the case of Canada, the US and the EU (as far as the
US is concerned, delays of payment of three years have sometimes been recorded). Both points have
been specifically pointed out by the countries of the Cairns group.
III.3- Domestic Support
Commitments have not led to significant policy changes which had already been decided or
implemented. These commitments are, moreover, of great interest in the sense that they have
conditioned policy changes (e.g. the FAIR Act in the US and the grain transportation reform in
Canada) and that they will influence future policy developments.25
III.3.1- Reduction of AMS
Support reduction commitments were implemented by 28 countries, other member countries
agreeing not to increase support above the base years level. Among these countries, the EU, Japan and
the US account for about 90 percent in absolute terms of Amber support (table 17)
27. Similarly, the
1995 rate of subsidy per dollar of output from Amber and Blue policies was about 30 percent in the
EU and Japan, and 7 percent in the US. While Japan do not report Blue Box payments, these account
respectively for 12 and 24 percent of total support in the US and the EU (table 17).
Table 17. Total Support for Specified Policies (1995)
Total Support Green Policies Amber Policies Blue Policies De Minimis
(millions of US$) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Australia 822 86 14 0 0
Canada 3 031 51 19 0 30
EU 113 239 21 54 24 1
Japan 69 607 47 52 0 1
New Zealand 128 100 0 0 0
US 60 926 76 10 12 3
All countries 285 724 44.4 40.4 12.3 1.8
Source: WTO Secretariat, based on Notifications as of May 1998
Actually, the discipline imposed on domestic policies through the reduction of AMS was rather
weak. An important feature that has limited the impact of domestic support commitments is the
aggregated disposition of AMS reduction. This has allowed most of the countries to reduce support in
a limited number of sectors, while maintaining or increasing it in others. This possibility has
constituted a key factor in the Agreement on domestic policies.
The EU, for example, has completed its commitments by lowering support to cereals and
oilseeds sectors, assistance to other commodities such as sugar, beef or fruits and vegetables being
maintained or increased (provided that 1992 level was not exceeded). In the US, deficiency payments
being excluded from current annual AMS calculation, commitments were automatically fulfilled
without any modifications (allowing even for an increase of other measures). No reduction has been
necessary in other sectors such as dairy products or sugar. In Japan, commitments have been met
through already implemented cutting of administered prices and production in the rice sector.
Another factor which has contributed to reduce the impact of domestic support commitment is
the base years of AMS calculation which constituted an historic peak for many commodities and
countries. Moreover, the base year being 1986 when assistance peaked during this year, AMS
reduction for most of the countries has de facto been less than 20 percent. With the new decline in
world prices, the constraint could however become more effective.
The exclusion of production-limiting programmes from AMS calculation has also restrained the
impact of the commitments in the sense that ￿ although less production and trade distorting ￿ these
programmes enter in contradiction with the principle of decoupling defined in the Agreement. The US
and the EU ￿ which are at the origin of these exemptions through the Blair House Agreement ￿
have particularly benefited from this disposition which has temporary avoid them to go further in their
reform process
28. The Peace Clause has, in addition, protected countries against disputes on the
                                                          
27 This result ￿ which in any case reflects the large degree of agriculture subsidisation in these countries ￿ has
also to be analysed in regard to the size of their agricultural sectors, as well as of the special conditions (such as
weather and demand factors) that have affected them during this year.
28 Examples of “Blue Box” policies are the former US deficiency payments and the EU compensatory payments.26
subject. The constraint could however become more active in case of a radical fall of world prices, the
amount of support entering the “ Blue Box ” being consolidated.
These conditions explain why the countries had not difficulties in meeting their support
reduction commitments. In Canada and New Zealand, 1995 support did not exceed 20 percent of
AMS commitment level, this ratio being comprised between 20 and 40 percent in the case of Australia
and the US, and between 60 and 80 percent for Japan and the EU. Similarly, on a global basis, the
total value of the 1995 AMS for the 24 countries who notified to the WTO reached 57 percent of
1986-88 base period (73 percent if the “Blue Box” is included). These results cannot, however, be
analysed independently of the particularly high world market prices.
Nevertheless, the fact that the AMS reduction has not been binding for the large majority of
countries does not mean that the constraints on domestic policies have been ineffective. The process
of re-instrumentation of domestic support programs ￿ away from those that most impede trade ￿ has
begun and the AMS constraint puts useful pressure on countries to continue this process. Exemption
from the AMS has constituted a powerful incentive for making domestic policies conform with the
“Green Box ”. This justify that global support from “Green Box” policies has increased by 54 percent
from 1986-88 base period to 1995  ￿ going principally to domestic food aid (40 percent),
infrastructure services (28 percent), general government service programs (24 percent) and investment
aids for structurally disadvantaged producers (12 percent). Of 19 countries having notified “Green
Box” support, 16 reported an increase in nominal terms since the base years, most of it being
concentrated in three countries (Japan, the EU and the US)
29.
Policy changes have occurred, in particular, in the US (in 1990 and in 1996 with the “FAIR
Act”, Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act), and in the EU (with in 1992 the new CAP
and in 1999 the Agenda 2000 Agriculture Reform, see Box 3), these two area relying less now on
prices support and more on direct payments and “Green Box” policies. The EU total support from
AMS plus “Blue Box” payments was already 15 percent below the base period in 1995. In the US,
AMS plus “Blue Box” payments decreased of 42 percent during the same time (total support and
“Green Box” payments increasing however on parallel). Acreage reduction programs were eliminated
in 1996, as well as deficiency payments in 1995 which were replaced by  decoupled production
payments.
Finally, a strength of the AMS can also be seen in the consolidation of the level of total
domestic support in nominal term. This means that inflation will reduce the real value of support over
time and will constraint the distortion caused by the remaining policies (although provision has been
made in case of high inflation).
III.3.2- The Global Support to Agriculture
If a real cut in the global support to the agricultural sector seems to have taken place in several
countries, the importance of the task ahead should not be underestimated (OECD, 1998a and b).
Actually in the OECD countries, the global support to agriculture as measured by the total
transfers from tax payers and consumers to the farm sector has shown a downward trend since 1986-
88 base years up to 1997 (table 18). Although no change in value can be noticed (total transfers still
being around 280 billions of US$), the decline in real terms is more effective (25 percent), as well as
related to population growth (8.5 percent) and to GDP (from 2.2 to 1.3). The same conclusions can be
drawn from the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE, in percentage, in real term per farmer and per
                                                          
29 It has to be noticed that the URAA provision established criteria for which policies may be considered “Green
Box” policies, but did no explicitly limit the amount of the subsidy. Any policy that transfers income to
producers can have nevertheless some effects on production by increasing wealth and limiting risk, especially if
funded with a large amount of government expenditures.27
hectare)
30, as well as from the producer Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC, which is the level of
protection expressed with the border price as a base, table 18)
31.
However, a more in depth analysis reveals that these improvements are largely due to 1995-96
high world prices and could be partially inverted. In fact, the PSE decline has been rather slow from
1986-88 to 1995 (from 45 to 40 in percentage) and the recent acceleration (35 percent in 1996-97) due
to the fall in market price support (with little changes in producer prices). Hence, reflecting a shift to
direct payments (table 19), the percentage Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (CSE, which measures the
implicit tax on consumers due to agricultural policies, table 18)
32 fell from 37 percent in 1986-88 to
24 percent in 1996-97.
Table 18. The Support to Agriculture : Selected Countries
OECD Canada EU Japan US
(in nominal terms) 1986-88 1997 1986-88 1997 1986-88 1997 1986-88 1997 1986-88 1997
PSE
Percentage 45 35 42 20 48 42 73 69 30 15
Per Full Time Farmer 14 17 15 8 12 18 16 24 20 13
Per Hectare (US$) 148 137 111 60 485 526 8872 8062 92 59
Producer NAC 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.2 2 1.7 3.3 2.8 1.4 1.2
Percentage CSE -37 -24 -24 -14 -44 -25 -57 -46 -13 -8
Consumer NAC 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.8 1.3 2.3 1.9 1.2 1.1
Total transfers
US$ billions 279 280 7.3 4.3 114.1 111.3 62.5 67.3 68.4 72.4
% of GDP 2.2 1.3 1.7 0.7 2.4 1.2 2.6 1.6 1.4 0.9
Per Capita (US$) 341 312 276 143 352 297 512 533 282 270
GDP Deflator 100 133 100 125 100 145 100 111 100 135
Source: from OECD Statistics
Other concern relates to the nature of the domestic support. Although the certain shift ￿ partly
due to the recent high market prices ￿ toward direct payments has to be noticed (from 18 to 23
percent of total support), assistance is still dominated by market prices support which still amounts 60
percent of the agricultural support (table 19). Thus, the majority of countries still rely more heavily on
the most trade distorting support measures, than on all other types of supports. In addition, this shift
has not always reduced the dependency of the agricultural sector on subsidies, being due most of the
time in an increase in direct payments to compensate farmers for reduction in administrative prices.
Moreover, direct payments scheme seems to remain largely linked to production or production
factors, as well as little progress seems to be made in targeting measures to specific needs or in
making them less production and trade distorting (Carson, 1998 ).
                                                          
30 The PSE is an indicator of value of monetary transfers to agriculture, which includes transfers from consumers
of agricultural products (through domestic market prices) and transfers from taxpayers (through budgetary
expenditures or tax exemptions). Not all these benefits go to farmers, input suppliers and marketing agents being
also concerned.
31 The NAC is an indicator of the effective price wedge between domestic and world markets created by
agricultural policies. The producer NAC is the ratio of the border price in national currency plus the unit PSE,
relative to the border price.
32 The CSE is an indicator of monetary transfer to consumers resulting from agricultural policies, which is
generally negative because market price support policies exceed budgetary-financed consumer subsidies. The
data are also shown as a percentage of the farmgate value of consumption. The consumer NAC is the ratio of the
border price in national currency plus the unit CSE (measured at the farmgate), relative to the border price.28
In addition, significant variations in the level and in the evolution of support persist between
countries. In fact, countries are characterised by wide differences in farm and production structures,
natural, social and economic conditions, as well as level of support to agriculture. In 1997, PSE
ranged from 3 percent in New Zealand to 76 percent in Switzerland. The lowest consumer NACs were
around 1 (in Australia, Mexico, New Zealand) while the highest were above 2 (Norway, Switzerland).
Table 19. Composition of Support to Agriculture
OECD Canada EU
(in %) 1986-88 1992-94 1997 1986-88 1992-94 1997 1986-88 1992-94 1997
Market Price Support 65 68 60 40 62 48 79 69 54
Direct Payments 18 16 23 28 22 14 8 18 31
Other Support 17 16 17 32 17 38 13 13 15
OECD Japan US
(in %) 1986-88 1992-94 1997 1986-88 1992-94 1997 1986-88 1992-94 1997
Market Price Support 65 68 60 84 83 86 40 48 42
Direct Payments 18 16 23 7 6 4 36 24 24
Other Support 17 16 17 9 11 10 24 28 35
Source: OECD (1998a et b)
Three groups of countries can be distinguished. The first one ￿ including Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the US ￿ has recorded continual and substantial reduction in their PSEs since
1986-88, and their support levels are now significantly below OECD average (table 18). The EU
occupies an intermediate position, with a level of support just above the OECD average and a
percentage PSE significantly below 1986-88 level since 1996-97. Finally the third group ￿ among
which Japan ￿ supports its agriculture sector at double or more the OECD average level as measured
by the percentage PSE, most of the countries concerned having however changed the way in which
support is provided.
Level of support varies also among commodities, specifically between crops and livestock
products, but also within these commodity groups (table 20). The level of support for crops has
decreased significantly from 57 percent in 1986-88 base years period to 38 percent of output in 1997,
with a particularly strong fall since 1995. The largest decline has been seen for maize, followed by
wheat, oilseed and other grains. Support in the rice sector has however remained very high (at 80
percent) and has increased in the case of sugar (reaching over 50 percent). However it has to be
noticed that, due to world market fluctuations, support for sugar has been subject to wide variations
during the last decade.
Table 20. OECD PSE by Commodity
(%) 1989-91 1996 1997 1989-91 1996 1997
Crops 45 34 37 Livestock 35 34 32
Wheat 41 25 32 Milk 61 52 52
Maize 29 15 20 Beef and Veal 31 36 33
Other Grains 43 34 37 Pigmeat 16 17 16
Rice 82 82 80 Poultry 16 15 12
Oilseeds 31 15 20 Sheepmeat 59 37 33
Sugar 49 46 49 Wool 13 8 7
Eggs 12 14 10
Source: OECD (1998a and b)
With a PSE of 38 percent in 1986-88, the livestock sector had initially a lower support than the
crop sector. This situation has recently quasi been inverted, PSE still accounting for 33 percent in29
1997. Within this sector, sheep meat and poultry meat have shown an above average decline, the
corresponding cut being small in the case of milk, wool and egg and null for beef, veal and pig meat.
Pig meat, poultry meat, eggs and wool sectors indicate however a particularly week level of support
(with a PSE at 15 percent), as opposed to milk which is the second highest supported sector after rice
(53 percent PSE).
Finally, the major shift from market price support to direct payments has taken place in the crop
sector, this shift being less important in the livestock sector. Direct support now accounts for more
than one-third of crops support and still only 10 percent of livestock support.
III.3.3.- Countries Experiences
In the US, recent developments have been marked by the shift from set-aside and deficiency
payments for crops, to degressive direct income payments. Through the 1996 FAIR Act, support is
now less market oriented and essentially based on direct payments to the farmers. Support to the crop
sector relies on the predetermined annual Production Flexibility Contract (PFC)
33, together with
minimum price provisions operating through non-recourse loans and marketing loans (export
subsidies still exist for wheat and rice exports, and the price of sugar is on its side supported by a
tariff-quota along with non-recourses loans). As far as the milk sector is concerned, minimum prices
still operate until 1999, as well as government purchase of dairy products, tariffs, import quotas and
export subsidies. Other livestock industries are only supported through border measures, including
tariff-quota for beef and export subsidies for pigmeat, poultry and eggs.
Consequently total support (as measured by PSE, table 18) has steadily decreased since 1986-
88 ￿ in particular because of the fall in commodity-linked deficiency payments and non-commodity
PFC payments ￿ and market price support now accounts for less than half of the total support (table
19). Similarly, US domestic prices ￿ as measured by the consumer NAC ￿ are very closed to the
world prices (only 10 percent above, table 18). This does not hold for sugar and milk that were around
80 percent above the border price, despite the reductions in domestic prices.
Over the last decade and particularly in recent years, Canada has also increased the market
orientation of its agricultural sector through a reduction in transfers and a shift away from market
price support to direct income payments measures. This can be seen through the sharp reduction in the
percentage PSE (from 42 to 20 percent between 1986-88 and 1997, table 18), as well as the increase
of the share of direct payments (from 10 to 30 percent, table 19). Canada terminated in 1997 the
transitional compensatory payments (already delinked from production) granted in 1995 to farmers
for the elimination of the grains transportation programme. This illustrates a more general change in
government practices away from ad hoc and temporary measures. In the grains and oilseeds sectors, as
well as for beef and horticultural products, support is now increasingly provided through income
protection and crop insurance measures.
However, the milk, poultry meat and egg sectors ￿ with support instruments such as supply
management, price supports and trade measures ￿ are still less market oriented. In particular, no
major changes were recently implemented in the dairy sector, which remains the most heavily
supported one in Canada (with 50 percent of total support and 90 percent of total price market
support). Industrial milk production continues to be restricted through production quotas and dairy
subsidies will not be phased out before 2003.
In the EU, there has been a clear downward trend in the market price support ￿ especially
since the early 90s ￿ which can be attributed in roughly equal part to the decrease in price support
(through the 1992 CAP reform) and the increase in world prices. In 1997, about half of total support
was in the form of market price support, against more than three-quarter in 1986-88 base years period
                                                          
33 PFC is one support of the least linked to commodities or production factors. PFC payments are based on
historical contracts area and related neither to the type of nor amount of crop currently produced. They are also
degressive and associated with an individual payment ceiling.30
(table 19). Consequently, the percentage CSE declined faster than the percentage PSE and domestic
prices ￿ as measured by the consumer NAC ￿ were in 1997 only 30 percent above world prices
(table 18). The new Agenda 2000 CAP reform ￿ through cuts in intervention prices and more direct
supports to farmers ￿ should accelerate this process.
With the 1992 CAP reform, direct payments for cereals and oilseeds were introduced, based on
historic regional yields and paid on condition of set-aside commitments. Administrative prices for
cereals were retained (although with a 20 percent cut) but not for oilseeds. Direct payments for beef
were also implemented, based on fixed reference numbers of livestock, along with the maintain of
administrative prices, intervention purchase, import protection and export subsidies. Administrative
prices and production quota are used for dairy and sugar products, in conjunction also with import
protection and export subsidies. Agenda 2000 agricultural reform plan further cuts in administrative
prices of cereals (15 percent), beef meat (20 percent) and dairy products (15 percent) and an increase
in direct decoupled support to these productions.
Finally in Japan, the level of agricultural support, as measured by the percentage PSE, has
remained among the highest in the OECD. This ratio was still in 1997 almost double of OECD
average, as well as domestic prices (through consumer NAC) amount the double of world prices
(table 18). In addition, 85 percent of support was market price support, this share being remarkably
stable since 1986-88 (table 19). In fact in Japan, support is mainly provided through administrated
prices, trade measures and supply management programmes, these measures having been applied for
almost all major commodities.
Recent trends (1996-97) show however a clear improvements of these indicators, due in
particular to the cut in 1997 of all administered prices (including rice). Similarly, in addition to a
certain liberalisation of the beef sector, the New Rice Policy (NRP) reinforced in 1997 the previous
diversion scheme through the introduction of a new type of direct payments and of market
mechanisms.
IV- PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW WTO ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS
The Uruguay Round itself initiated the next step for multilateral process of trade liberalisation
in agriculture. The URAA calls for talks to be started no latter than 1999. The WTO Minister Meeting
in Singapore in December 1996 confirmed this schedule. In spite of the failure of the Seattle meeting,
some of the issues that will most likely form the basis for the new Round of Negotiations can already
be anticipated from the distance to be travelled in term of agricultural trade liberalisation, as well as
from the questions raised by several countries (Josling, Tangermann and Warley, 1996 ; Josling,1998
; Miner, Josling, MacLaren and Tangermann, 1996 ; Tangermann, 1996 and 1997).
The essential point that will obviously be addressed during the next Round of Negotiations
consists in the deepening of agriculture trade liberalisation. Actually, a strategy will have to be agreed
on, regarding additional market access provisions, further reduction in export subsidies and more
discipline in the area of trade-distorting domestic support. Specific issues could be the question of
STEs and of quantitative export restraints that have not been precisely addressed by the URAA.
Some initial talks might, in addition, concern the improvement of  URAA’s functioning. A
number of potential problems identified during the Singapore Ministerial Meeting includes the
administration of the Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs), the operation of the Special Safeguard Provisions
(SSP) and the implementation of the export subsidy restraints. Additional points could be the
incompletion of the Agreement such as the authorisation given to Japan, Korea, Philippines and Israel
to postpone tariffication of some products (through the Special Treatment (ST) conditions), or the
question of export credits on which the countries were supposed to work on.
Finally, structural issues could also be considered, such as the question of the ongoing entry of
China, as well as the potential one of Russia, Ukraine and other countries into the WTO ￿ which31
terms of accession and agreed schedule will influence the next talks  ￿ as well as the possible
increase in markets volatility or the relation between regional trade groups and the multilateral
process.
IV.1. Market Access
One major market access question is to reduce significantly the high level and dispersion of
agricultural tariffs. But URAA issues on administration of TRQs, Special Safeguard Provisions (SSP)
and completion of tariffication should also be addressed.
IV.1.1. Improving Market Access
The longer term objective will certainly be to lower the gap between average agricultural tariffs
and those in other sectors. Among the Quads countries, this is particularly the case of Japan, and to a
lower extend of the EU, which protection is still higher than in the US and in Canada. The experience
of past GATT negotiation in reducing industrial tariffs provides options for approaching agricultural
tariff negotiations and several techniques have already been thought for implementing the
improvement in market access (Josling,1998 ; Tangermann, 1996).
One possibility could be to use the same reference period as the URAA and apply a further
reduction of, say 36 percent as previously, for the next tariffs cut. This would have the advantage of
continuity and simplicity, a reopening of this issue being potentially controversy. Another advantage
can be seen in an acceleration of the liberalisation process, the same percentage cut having greater
impact the higher the base tariff used. The continuation of the same schedule asks however the
question of the provision allowing countries to lower tariffs by only 15 percent for some items (while
cutting more the less sensitive commodity tariffs), which has led to an increase of prohibitive duties
and of tariff dispersion. An constraint could be to increase significantly this minimum of 15 percent,
or to introduce a weighted tariff reduction (that would permit to take into consideration imbalance
between high and low protected products).
As an alternative, countries could agree on a rule of “ no exception ”, which has the advantage
of simplicity and transparency. This becomes an “ across-the-board ” tariff reduction, the same cut
being applied to all tariffs. An inconvenient of this system is that it leaves some tariffs at a very high
level. Another possibility could be to apply to agriculture the “ Swiss Formula ” (used for tariffs
reduction in industrial goods in the Tokyo Round) which consist in reducing more the highest tariffs.
This formula would reduce tariffs dispersion. Same results could be obtained by defining a maximum
level of tariff, to which all higher tariffs would have to be reduced.
In fact, an important issue of the next Round of Negotiations will be to reduce effectively
protection, the “dirty” tariffication process allowing countries to accept important reductions in bound
rates without a significant improvement in market access. That increases the importance of achieving
reductions in bound rates that are sufficient to reduce actual rates. It is therefore important to have a
clear idea of relative levels of both bound and actual rates for these high tariffs items before deciding
on an approach to reducing tariffs. This question also highlights the important role that provision of
minimum access and assurance of current access will need to continue to play in the coming
Negotiations.
All countries are concerned to various degree by this phenomena of “dirty” tariffication, and
specially non OECD countries. Among the Quads countries, the EU and Japan register a higher tariff
dispersion, as well as the most important increase in tariffs peaks. As far as products are concerned,
sugar and dairy products are still the sectors the most protected. This is the case in Japan, the EU, the
US and Canada (for dairy). But wheat and beef products exhibit also high level of protection in Japan
and the EU, these two countries being globally still in addition the most protected of the Quads
countries.
A somewhat different approach could consist in negotiating “ zero-for-zero ” agreements that
would eliminate tariffs completely on particular goods. The objective of this technique is to permit to32
trade to expand in markets where protection has been reduced and to liberalisation to spread
progressively to all commodities (Miner, Josling, MacLaren and Tangermann, 1996). This seems
however to be a very optimistic scenario which in turn might introduce new distortions between
products.
An alternative procedure to tackle the problem of the high levels of tariffs resulting from
tariffication could be to expand the guaranteed market access ￿ although the replacement of TRQs
with tariff-only protection permitting greater volumes of trade is a preferred option. In spite of the
problems associated with TRQs, which in particular are not binding, they still in principle provide
more market access that  NTBs they replaced, particularly when compared with absolute quotas.
Under TRQs, imports can exceed the quota amount as long as the market is willing to incur the tariff
applied on quantities in excess of the quota. Likewise, tariffs are a transparent instrument of
protection compared to NTBs.
In fact, some of the beyond tariffs have been set at such a high level, that it might be difficult to
reduce them to levels that could allow significantly trade to occur. This have been the case in
particular of Japan and Canada. But all the countries are concerned to various level depending on the
commodities. Questions could touch sugar and some dairy products in the US, the EU and Japan ;
wheat products in Canada, the EU and Japan ; eggs, poultry meat and some dairy products in Canada ;
beef and fruits and vegetables in the EU ; as well as pigmeat in Japan. In this context, the possibility
of increasing TRQs quantities could also provide ￿ in addition of lessening the impact of these high
“ above tariff ” quota ￿ a simple way of reducing the importance of TRQs. Of course, this would
only happen if TRQ administration allow to effectively attract the guaranteed access quantity.
However, the question remains how much TRQs have to be expanded before the high “ above-
tariff ” quota on imports would be made irrelevant. Another question is the one of preferential access
which WTO members give to some countries and which is part of current access. The EU is
particularly touched by this point, as well as the US and Canada. Some forms of negotiation could
concern, at the same time, the level of the “ within quota ” tariffs generally left to the discretion of the
importing country. Quads countries are however not really concerned by this point ￿ except for
butter in Canada and the EU, and for sugar in the US. Finally, some countries could be questioned on
their way of calculating TRQ at a broad level of aggregation without specific allocation, which permit
in a second time to lower their commitments.
A relative issue could be the one of the complexity of the tariff structure, which appears most
of the time as a combination of various tariffs (specific and ad valorem), depending in addition on the
country or the period of time. This is the case of the US and the EU, which still use the most this
possibility among the Quads countries (Japan and Canada having however recently registered a
complication of their tariffs’ structure). Some countries might ask a simplification of the tariff
structure, as well as an elimination of the specific duties which lack of transparency have also been
criticised.
Finally, it is worth stressing that many grey areas in tariff reductions could be avoided by
binding tariffs at the 6 digit level of the Harmonised system. This might seem a very technical
question, but the fact that beyond the 6 digit level, classifications are country specific and no longer
internationally harmonised makes it possible to use many statistical tricks in order to lessen the
impact of the agreement, or at least to make assessment of the implementation almost impossible.
Practitioners have noticed that an assessment of the effect of market access commitments for the
URAA is extremely difficult because of the complexity and the lack of transparency of the Schedules
in the US, the EU and Japan, for example.
IV.1.2- Administration of TRQs
The difficulty of TRQs to open up significantly agricultural protected markets has been clearly
identified, as well as the urgent need of revision of their administration. While TRQs were settled to
eliminate the application of NTBs, they often leave some non tariff barriers to trade. It is the case
when beyond tariffs are prohibitive, but also through administration methods which allow to manage33
the flow of imports. A particular way by which world price signals to the domestic market of the
importing countries can be impaired, is through the importers’ market power. When such a power
exists, importers can influence the volumes imported and manipulate internal prices. Consequently,
although tariffication provides a useful tool for market access with a view to negotiating reduction, it
might be an insufficient instrument.
The next Round of Negotiations could ask for additional discipline to ensure access as agreed
by the schedules, TRQs fill rates exhibiting rather different level depending on the countries. Even if
Canada, the EU and Japan show upper WTO average rates of fill ￿ compared to the US which
perform poorly in this field ￿ progress could be asked to every country. In fact, rates of fill vary also
according to commodities. The EU could have to justify its low fill rates in the field of drinks, eggs,
fruits and vegetable, and cereals. The US on their side could be questioned in the case of fibres,
coffee-tea, fruits and vegetables and dairy products. Japan and Canada could be concerned by their
low fill rates respectively in oilseeds and dairy products, and oilseed and coarse grains.
Actually for several countries (among which the US), administration of  TRQs raises the
question of state involvement in agricultural trade. Although administration of TRQs by STEs do not
seem to have constituted a mechanism to restrict imports (see section III-A3), these entities retain the
ability to do it. New interference seems also to have been generated ￿ for example through licensing
procedures ￿ which has generated an increase in rent seeking activities and has countered market
opening (Hataway and Ingco, 1996 ; Josling, 1998). But the lack of transparency in the pricing and
operational activities of STEs has also be identified as potentially masking import barriers (as well as
export subsidies).
In this context, the opacity of the trade regime of some countries where STEs play a large role
will figure as an issue of the next Round of Negotiations. In particular, countries like Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, as well as Central European countries ￿ regarding the markets
of wheat, rice and dairy products ￿ could be asked to go further that just ensuring that state trading
importer do not give more protection than bound tariffs. A solution could be to require an increase in
the share of TRQs privatly traded.
The Negotiations will also no doubt focus on developing a more uniform system for the
administration of  TRQs. If it is not possible to stipulate a single procedure, a set of acceptable
methods could be considered which could go, in addition of applied tariffs method which is the
easiest and more efficient one, from auctioning (as economically efficient technique), to the
administratively simple allocation on the basis of first-come first-served patterns (improvement of
TRQs fill rates being searched in this case). An auction system would, however, not prevent the
exporter (in order to capture the rent) to sell at a maximum price on the domestic market. The
question of additional conditions could also be discussed, in order to improve  TRQs administration
methods.
Another issue could relate to the conversion of TRQs into an obligation to import rather than an
opportunity or ￿ rather than fine-tuning the administrative process ￿ to steadily increase TRQs in
order to weaken their impact. Finally, the question of including previously trade arrangements into
actual current access commitments may also be discussed by several countries (such as Canada,
Australia and New Zealand).
More specifically, the EU could be questioned on the possibility (notified for some products to
the WTO, but not used) to fill minimum access commitments through existing preferential accord, as
well as on the notification of quantities committed but not necessary imported. The problem of the
very short delays of validity of licenses for wheat, durum wheat and sugar could also be pointed out
by some exporting countries. The Canadian TRQs administration methods could also be questioned
￿ and specifically the dairy products regime ￿ as well as the importance (although permitted) of
existing preferential accords (essentially through NAFTA) in filling market access commitments. The
US could be inquired on the respect of the MNF principle regarding their minimum access
obligations, along with the non reallocation of licenses (although permitted) attached to their current34
access commitments. Finally, Japan could have to justify the low TRQs fill rates attached to some of
its administration methods (such as allocation to traditional importer and to producer groups) and its
additional conditions (such as limits in TRQs shares and non reallocation of licenses).
IV.1.3- Special Safeguard Provisions
Trade safeguards have generally been considered by governments like a condition to trade
liberalisation. The issue that might be part of the next agenda, is the possible utilisation of the SSP by
developed countries to maintain protection against imports. Although the utilisation of the URAA
SSP have not been exaggerated, Japan, the US and to a lesser extend the EU could be inquired on the
subject. More specifically, the question of the calculation of the trigger price and trigger volume
levels could be raised by some a countries, among which the ones of the Cairns Group 
34. A proposed
solution could be to use the external prices which enter into the calculation of tariff equivalent, as
trigger prices for the SSP. This would guarantee that additional duties would neither be used too
often, nor set at a too high level. Commitments to phased out SSP after a period of transition could
also be required.
IV.1.4- Completion of Tariffication
Next talks will also surely address the question of Special Treatment, which allowed some
countries to delay tariffication of some commodities. This is the case Korea and Philippines for rice,
as well as of Israel for some other products. Pressure might appear this time on these countries. Japan
on its side ￿ which had liberalised progressively its rice market in increasing in particular the amount
of rice privately trade ￿ has recently achieved the tariffication of its rice sector. Korea could be
following in the near future. Philippines and Israel will not be neither in a strong position to resist the
implementation of tariffication.
IV.2. Exports
The concern of export subsidies will also be of great importance during the next Round of
Negotiations. The practice of subsiding exports survived the URAA ￿ despite in reduced form ￿
and it will probably become more difficult to persuade countries who export with little or no subsidies
to allow countries such as the US or the EU to continue these practices. This will be the point of the
Cairns Group, which is surely going to require significant progress on this question. Relative issues
are the ones of the state trading exporter (which practices have often be assimilated to hidden
subsidies), as well as of export credits (which have continued despite efforts to negotiate within the
OECD). The questions of export taxes and of export restraints will obviously be other concerns of the
talks.
IV.2.1. Reduction of Export Subsidies
As for market access, the simplest way of reducing the importance of export subsidies could be
to extend the URAA modalities. In spite of the initial weak constraint due in particular to the
reference period of calculation, this would imply an additional cut of 36 percent in budget
expenditures, as well as of 20 percent in the volume of subsidised exports. This means ￿ compared
to pre-URAA situation ￿ that 60 percent of total exports would have to be subsidised with only 29
percent of 1986-90 expenditures. This would reduce distortions in a considerable proportion and
make commitments more binding than the URAA ones. Hence, in spite of on going reforms, the
Quads countries could suffer from the new export subsidies restrictions. This could be the case of the
EU for commodities such as beef, cheese, grain, rice, sugar, wine and fruits and vegetable, as well as
of the US and Canada for some dairy products.
                                                          
34This group is composed of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chilli, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay.35
A way to guarantee a real improvement in the field of export subsidies could also consist, in
addition, to remove the facility regarding unused export subsidies. This possibility has been utilised in
particular by the EU and the US to a lesser extend. This point will be argued essentially by the
countries of the Cairn Group. A more definitive way defended by these countries could also be to
phase out export subsidies at the end of the new implementation period. Finally, specific topics such
as the consistency of the Canada’s new dairy regime with WTO rules, as well as the utilisation by the
EU of the “Inward Processing Relief” system to subsidise more quantities of cheese could also be of
some concern.
IV.2.2. Export Credits
Though OECD countries have negotiated a code for non-agricultural export credits which put
limit on credit term and length of credit extension, it has not been possible to include agriculture in
this agreement. This point is perceived by several countries as having to be included in the export
subsidies commitments. New progress on this issue will surely be required during the next Round of
Negotiations and agreement on the allowable terms for such credits seek. This will be the point for
example of Australia, Canada and New Zealand that have criticised the abusive use of such
instruments by the US in particular. However, the question of to what extend is such credit necessary
to compensate the financial risk of transactions with some countries, will surely be raised.
IV.2.3. State Trading Exporters
The issue of state trading exporters that might be addressed during the next talks, could be the
one of monitoring and transparency, these enterprises being accused to compete unfairly with the
private sector. Actually, there is a widespread preoccupation in those countries where agricultural
products are privately traded, that STEs for example obtain cheap credit from their government and
offer better terms to buyers, which practices can be considered as hidden subsidies. In fact, a more
general concern regards  STEs activities which  ￿ through the exclusive rights given to them  ￿
contribute to trade distortions. Although the fact that only a few of the major STEs have the potential
to significantly affect world trade and that reform has begun to erode the powers of some of the most
powerful STEs (Ackerman, 1997), concerns about STEs trade practices and on going and potential
accession of countries such as China, Russia or Ukraine  will keep STEs on the WTO agenda. These
point will be particularly argued by Australia, New Zealand, the EU and the US.
IV.2.4. Exports Restrictions
Within the GATT, export controls are generally disallowed, though export taxes are deemed
innocuous. However, an explicit exception is done for “ export restrictions temporally applied to
prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other essential to the exporting contracting part ”.
This issue has not up to now represent a really concern, as exporter do not usually complain about
restriction imposed on their competitors. The problem to be taken into consideration is that the export
restriction exacerbate the shortage on the world market. This is inconsistent with the Food Security
Declaration appended to the URAA and might be considered as damaging for countries like Japan or
DC, which depend on the world market for their supplying. This situation is all the most subject to
criticism that these countries have generally made efforts to open their markets. It is moreover
inconsistent with an open trade system. Restrictions on exports in times of high prices distort the trade
system as much as subsidies that operate when prices are weak, and it is difficult to ask producer in
exporting countries to absorb the risk of low prices without subsidies, but to deny those producers the
rewards of satisfying a market in times of high prices. The EU 1996 export taxes on cereals may be
criticised at this occasion.
IV.3.- Domestic Support
The reduction of domestic support through the AMS have been assessed to be the least
effective of the URAA, because in particular of the choice of the year of reference and of the
aggregate level of AMS reduction, as well as of the creation of the “Blue Box” . In front of the actual36
weak output on this matter, a question for the next Round of Negotiations could be whether to
reinforce or to abandon the attempt to constrain agricultural domestic policies. In fact, in spite of the
reduction of the “Amber Box” support, global financial assistance to agriculture has little decreased
and is still dominated by market subsidies. In addition, support to agriculture is still important in
countries such as Japan and the EU to a lesser extend, which could be more particularly questioned on
the subject.
A positive point can be seen, however, in the fact that most developed countries have
progressively modified their domestic programs to improve the targeting and reduce the output-
increasing nature of farm income supports. This is the case of Canada, as well as of the US, with the
new Farm Bill (Young and Westcott, 1996) which made further progress in decoupling payments to
farmers from output, in order to be compatible with the “ Green Box ”. The EU is going into the same
direction with the continuation through the Agenda 2000 of the reform started in 1992, as a way of
making CAP consistent with enlargement. Large uncertainties persist, however, as to the qualification
of the Agenda 2000 direct payments for the "Green Box" category. Given the present definition of the
Green Box, EU direct payments do not qualify.
In this context, the tightening of AMS constraint could permit to avoid a reversion of these
policy changes and to promote further reforms. This would made the “ Green Box ”  more active. One
possibility could consist, following the Uruguay Round initial project, in making AMS commodity
specific. This possibility had previously been abandoned under the pressure of the US and the EU ￿
the aggregation allowing to weaken the impact of the AMS constraint. This position could be argued
by countries such as Australia, and New Zealand. Another possibility could consist in closing the
“ Blue Box ”. But the definition of the “ Green Box ”  and the existence of other potentially trade
distorting programmes, such as crop insurance (which may increase the incentive to produce by
reducing the risk, Goodwin and Smith, 1995) or environmental payments could also be questioned.
These two last points could be raised by Australia, New Zealand and Canada in particular.
V- CONCLUSION
In spite of the failure of the Seattle conference and the mix results of the URAA, all
the countries have expressed the wish to continue the liberalisation of the agricultural sector.
In this context, it is probably certain that, in order to deepening the scope of the next set of
reforms, the analysis of the implementation of the URAA will be part of the next Round of
Negotiation. Improvement of URAA functioning will be seek and a strategy regarding
additional market access provisions, further reduction in export subsidies and more discipline
in the area of trade-distorting domestic support will be discussed.
In addition, some structural issues will constitute other important subjects of the next
talks. This is particularly the case of the entry of new countries into the WTO which has a
strong agricultural component. In fact, the prospective new WTO members are major players,
actual or potential, in agricultural markets. Under what terms they join the WTO will
influence the nature of those markets.
Thirty countries are seeking accession to the WTO, among which China has recently
been accepted. Of the 30, almost half are Baltic countries and the New Independent States of
the former Soviet Union, and 6 are Asian countries. Agriculture contribute significantly to the
economies of many of these countries, which very often are net importers of agricultural
goods. This is the case of the Russian federation, Taiwan, South Arabia and Algeria. In China,
which food imports are also consequent, agriculture goods trade contributes to a quarter of
agricultural trade of the group of acceding countries. Consequently, accession of these new37
countries could spur agricultural trade and benefit to actual WTO members as these
economies become more open.
In particular, the opportunities that result of the strong economic growth and the huge
market potential of China, will make of this country a major player in the agricultural trade.
For example, China’s growing economy points to increased demand for many agricultural
products such as meats, fruits, vegetables, dairy products, sugar and tobacco. But the question
of under what conditions such trade will take place constitutes an important issue to address.
Another question that is to debated, is the one of the economic structure of the country where
sate-owned firm still produce much of the output.
Finally, some talks could also concern the interaction between the regional and the
multilateral trade liberalisation process. Many regional trade agreements have now integrated
agriculture in the free-trade provisions. This is the case of Nafta, Mercosur, Caricom, the CER
between Australia and New Zealand, and the Europe Agreement with the Central and Eastern
European countries. This gives a new significance to these agreements and necessitates some
co-ordination with the multilateral process.
In particular, these blocs may begin to assume a role in the negotiations of agricultural
rules and a special attention will have to be paid, such as to avoid trade diversion, on the level
of protection on non-partner imports. On the contrary, regional trade agreements can be seen
as a step toward free trade in agriculture and even provide more incentives to members
countries to modify their domestic policies in order not to cause tensions among regional
trading partners. In this context, the positive aspects of these new developments should have
to be taken into consideration during the next Round of Negotiations.38
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Agriculture Information Bulletin N° 76, USDA, August.Table A1. Market Access Concessions, Commodities Subject to Tariffication 
Wheat
In quota Tariffs/tariffs equivalent Percentage
Country In quota In quota In quota In quota Base tariffs MPS* reduction from
tariffs 1995 tariffs 2000 volumes 1995 volumes 2000 Base tariffs in ad valorem in ad valorem base to final
(1 000 tons) (1 000 tons) equivalent equivalent bound tariffs
EU - - 300 300 Écu 149/t 173% 107% 36
Écu 231/t 156% 84% 36
Canada C$ 4.41/t C$ 1.90/t 136,13 226,88 90% 90% 23% 15
57,7% 57,7% 18% 15
Switzerland  SF 350/t SF 350/t 70 70 SF 890/t 333% 301% 15
Japan - - 5 565 5 740 Y 65 000/t 280% 651% 15
Y 51 700/t Y 45 000/t
Norway NKr 2130/t NKr 2130/t 252 252 NKr 3040/t 507% 266% 30
Iceland 350% 350% na 50
Mexico 50% 50% 605 605 US$100 117% na 10
Source: OECD (1995)
* MPS : unit market price support as measured for the PSE, as a percentage of the external reference price (average 1986-88).Table A2. Market Access Concessions, Commodities Subject to Tariffication 
Beef
In quota Tariffs/tariffs equivalent Percentage
Country In quota In quota In quota In quota Base tariffs MPS reduction from
tariffs 1995 tariffs 2000 volumes 1995 volumes 2000 Base tariffs in ad valorem in ad valorem base to final
(1 000 tons) (1 000 tons) equivalent equivalent bound tariffs
US US$ 44/t US$ 44/t 656,6 656,6 31,1% 31,1% 7% 15
EU 20% 20% 157 157 20% 174% 90% 36
Écu 2 673/t 34
Canada - - 76,4 76,4 37,9% 37,9% 3,4% 30
Switzerland  SF 940/t SF 940/t 22,5 22,5 SF 8 920/t 296% 250% 15
Japan - - - - 93% 93% 173% 46
Norway NKr 12 150/t NKr 12 150/t 0,1 1,2 NKr 37 970/t 405% 144% 15
Iceland 115% - 0,057 0,095 358% 358% 113% 15
Mexico - - - - 50% 50% na 10
Source: OECD (1995)Table A3. Market Access Concessions, Commodities Subject to Tariffication 
Sugar
In quota Tariffs/tariffs equivalent Percentage
Country In quota In quota In quota In quota Base tariffs MPS reduction from
tariffs 1995 tariffs 2000 volumes 1995 volumes 2000 Base tariffs in ad valorem in ad valorem base to final
(1 000 tons) (1 000 tons) equivalent equivalent bound tariffs
US US$ 31/t US$ 31/t 22 22 US$ 421/t 216% 144% 15
US$ 9/t US$ 9/t 1 117 1 117 US$ 399/t na na 15
EU - - 1 304,7 1 304,7 Écu 524/t 274% 235% 20
- - - - Écu 424/t na na 20
Canada - - - - C$ 41.67/t 16% 9,0% 15
C$ 32.54/t na na 15
Switzerland  - - - - SF 720/t 293% 350% 15
Australia - - - - A$ 140/t 53% 12% 50
Japan - - - - Y 121 300/t 253% 184% 15
Y 84 500/t na na 15
Norway - - - - NOK 100/t na na 70
Iceland - - - - 350% 350% na 50
Mexico 50% 50% 110 184 US$ 400 206% na 28
Source: OECD (1995)Table A4. Market Access Concessions, Commodities Subject to Tariffication 
Butter
In quota Tariffs/tariffs equivalent Percentage
Country In quota In quota In quota In quota Base tariffs MPS reduction from
tariffs 1995 tariffs 2000 volumes 1995 volumes 2000 Base tariffs in ad valorem in ad valorem base to final
(1 000 tons) (1 000 tons) equivalent equivalent bound tariffs
US US$ 123/t US$ 123/t 4 7 US$ 1 813/t 138% 134% 15
EU Écu 868/t Écu 868/t 76,7 86,7 Écu 2 962/t 254% 199% 36
Canada C$ 2 646/t C$ 1 138/t 1,96 3,27 351% 351% 199% 15
Switzerland  SF 200/t SF 200/t 527 527 SF 19 320/t 1136% 1065% 15
Japan 35% 35% 137,2 137,2 35% 657% 507% 15
Y 926 000/t Y 806 000/t - - Y 1 159 000/t - - 15
Norway NKr 4 420/t NKr 4 420/t 0,3 0,6 NKr 29 640/t 434% 124% 15
Iceland 216% - 0,032 0,053 674% 674% 362% 15
Mexico - - - - 50% na na 25
Source: OECD (1995)Table A5. URAA Tariffs Reduction Commitments: 
US  Schedule
Base rate of Bound rate of Percentage Special 
Product duty duty reduction safeguard
$/t or % $/t or % %
Wheat
Common Wheat  7,7 3,5 55 no
Durum Wheat  7,7 6,5 16 no
Coarse Grain
Maise 9,8 2,5 74 no
Barley 3,4 1,5 56 no
Oats - - - -
Sorghum 8,8 2,2 75 no
Rice 33 21 36 no
Oilseeds
Soyabeans - - - -
Rapesedd 9 5,8 36 no
Sunflower - - - -
Sugar
Raw (Cane) Sugar  399 399 15 yes
Raw (Beet) Sugar  421 357 15 yes
Refined Sugar  421 357 15 yes
Milk
Liquid Milk 0.017 $/l 0.015 $/l 12 no
Liquid Milk 175 154 15 yes
Skim Milk 1 831 1 556 15 yes
Butter  1 813 1 541 15 yes
Cheese (Emmental) 1 631 1 386 15 yes
Cheese (Cheddar) 1 443 1 227 15 no
Beef and Veal
Live Animals 22 10 55 no
Beef Meat 31% 26,4% 15 yes
Pigmeat - - - -
Poultrymeat 110 88 20 no
Sheepmeat
Sheepmeat 33 28 15 yes
Lamb 11 7 36 no
Wool 220 187 15 no
Eggs 0.035 $/douz 0.028 $/douz
Eggs 49 40 20 no
Source: OECD (1995)                    Table A6. URAA Tariffs Reduction Commitments
EU  Schedule
Base rate of Bound rate of Percentage Special 
Product duty duty reduction safeguard
Ecu/t or % Ecu/t or % %
Wheat
Common Wheat  149 95 36 yes
Durum Wheat  231 148 36 yes
Coarse Grain
Maise 147 94 36 yes
Barley 145 93 36 yes
Oats 139 89 36 yes
Rice 330 211 36 yes
Oilseeds
Soyabeans - - - -
Rapesedd - - - -
Sunflower - - - -
Sugar
Raw (Cane) Sugar  424 339 20 yes
Refined Sugar  524 419 20 yes
Milk
Liquid Milk 354 227 36 yes
Skim Milk 1 485 1 188 20 yes
Butter  2 962 1 896 36 yes
Cheese (Emmental) 274 175 36 yes
Cheese (Cheddar) 2 611 1 671 36 yes
Beef and Veal
Live Animals 16% 10,20% 36 yes
1 454 931 36 no
Beef Meat 20% 12,80% 36 yes
2 763 1768
Pigmeat 838 536 36 no
Poultrymeat 410 262 36 yes
Sheepmeat
Sheepmeat 20% 12,80% 36 yes
Lamb 2 677 1723 36 yes
Wool - - - -
Eggs 475 304 36 yes
Source: OECD (1995)Table A7. URAA Tariffs Reduction Commitments
Canada  Schedule
Percentage Special 
Product specific ad valorem specific ad valorem reduction safeguard
C$/t % C$/t % %
Wheat
Common Wheat  - 90 - 76,5 15 yes
Durum Wheat  - 57,7 - 49 15 yes
Coarse Grain
Maise 1,97 - 1,26 - 36 no
Barley - 111,4 - 94,7 15 yes
Oats 18,12 - - 100 no
Rice - - - - - -
Oilseeds
Soyabeans - - - - - -
Rapesedd - - - - - -
Sunflower - - - - - -
Sugar
Raw (Cane) Sugar  32,54 - 27,66 - 15 no
Refined Sugar  41,67 - 35,42 - 15 no
Milk
Liquid Milk - 283,8 - 241,3 15 no
min 40,6 - 34,5 - 15 yes
SMP - 237,2 - 201,6 15 yes
min 2 360 - 2 006 - 15 no
Butter - 351,4 - 298,7 15 yes
min 4 708 - 4 001 - 15 no
Cheese - 289 - 245,6 15 yes
 (Cheddar) 4 149 - 3 528 -
Beef and Veal
Live Animals 22 - 11 - 50 no
Beef Meat - 37,9 - 26,5 30 yes
Pigmeat
Pigmeat - - - - - -
Poultrymeat
Poultrymeat - 280,4 - 238,3 15 yes
min 1 960 - 1 666 - 15 no
Turkey - 182 - 154,7 15 yes
min 2 295 - 1951 - 15 no
Sheepmeat
Lamb 66,1 - 42,3 - 36 no
Wool - - - - - -
Eggs 280,4 238,3 15 no
min 5 037,70 - 4 280,50 - 15 no
Eggs 192,3 163,5 15 no
min 1 381,80 - 1 174,50 - 15 no
Source: OECD (1995)
Base rate of duty Bound rate of duty                Table A8. URAA Tariffs Reduction Commitments
Japan  Schedule
Base rate of Bound rate of Percentage Special 
Product duty duty reduction safeguard
Y/t or % Y/t or % %
Wheat
Common Wheat  65 000 55 000 15 yes
Durum Wheat  65 000 55 000 15 yes
Coarse Grain
Maise for feed - - - -
Maise other 15 000 12 000 20 no
Barley 46 000 39 000 15 yes
Oats 10% 8,5% 15 no
Rice - - - -
Oilseeds
Soyabeans - - - -
Rapesedd - - - -
Sunflower - - - -
Sugar
Raw (Cane) Sugar  84 500 71 800 15 no
Refined Sugar  121 300 103 100 15 no
Milk
Liquid Milk 25% 21% 15 yes
134 000 114 000 15 no
Skim Milk 25% 21,3% 15 yes
466 000 396 000 15 no
Butter  35% 29,8% 15 yes
1 159 000 985 000 15 no
Cheese (fresh) 35% 29,8% 15 no
Cheese (processed) 79,7% 40% 50 no
Beef and Veal
Live Animals 45 000 38 250 15 no
Beef Meat 93% 50% 46 no
Pigmeat no
Gate price 553 000 489 000 12 no
Specific 425 000 361 000 15 yes
Ad Valorem 5% 4,3% 15 yes
Poultrymeat
Poultrymeat 14% 11,9% 15 no
Sheepmeat
Lamb - - - -
Wool - - - no
Eggs 20% 17% 15 no
Source: OECD (1995)Table A9. TRQs Tariffs for Selected Products (%)
Specific Country Nominal Protection Coefficient            Tariff Rates (1995) TRQs Fill 
Allocation Base 86-88 1995 Base 86-88 ITRQs OTRQs Rates 1995
Wheat
Canada 36 13 90 20 90 18
EU no 102 13 162 0 89 100
Japan no 640 535 271 0 51 100
Sugar
EU yes 227 81 404 0 209 100
Japan no 89 85 136 146 na
US yes 137 54 198 44 115 100
Cheese
Canada yes 149 87 289 2 289 100
EU yes 202 166 202 13 149 97
Japan no 31 30 34 0 35 na
US yes 89 31 111 10 63 87
Butter
Canada yes 198 129 351 114 351 100
EU (current yes 205 165 258 70 225 na
EU (min) 77 225
Japan no 519 533 633 35 773 27
US yes 138 7 141 7 97 6
Skim Milk
Canada yes 46 21 237 3 23 100
EU yes 111 41 161 33 81 100
Japan(school) no 266 189 321 0 287 58
Japan(other) no   346 0 297 49
US no 73 23 179 2 44 27
Beef
Canada yes 9 0 38 2 38 100
EU yes 91 46 160 20 88 85
US yes 6 0 31 3 31 66
Pigmeat
EU no 40 11 86 23 67 100
Japan(ad val) no 70 149 5 5 na
Japan (spe) no 235 285 na
Poultrymeat
Canada  no 18 0 280 13 280 100
Canada(turk) no 18 11 182 13 182 100
EU no 48 30 48 14 41 100
Japan no 13 12 14 14 na
Sheepmeat
EU yes 181 56 192 0 109 80
Source: OECD (1999b)
 Table A0. Export Competition: Volume Commitment
Average Average
(1 000 tons)  1986-90 1991-92 1995 2000
Wheat
US 18 400 21 400 20 200 14 500
EU 17 000 20 300 19 100 13 400
Canada 112 000 14 500 13 600 8 900
Coarse Grain 
US 2 000 - 1 900 1 600
EU 12 600 - 12 200 10 000
Canada 4 600 - 4 400 3 600
Oilseeds
US 200 700 600 100
Canada 2 200 - 2 100 1700
Butter
US 27 47 43 21
EU 463 - 447 366
Canada 4,4 12,5 9,5 3,5
Australia 49,1 68,7 63,7 38,8
Cheese
US 3,8 4,8 3,8 3
EU 386 427 407 305
Canada 11,5 13,1 12,4 9,1
Australia 63,1 76,4 72 49,9
Skim Milk
US 86 116 108,2 68,2
EU 308 - 297 243
Canada 56,9 - 54,9 44,9
Australia 85,6 114 106,3 6,6
Beef
US 22 - 21,5 17,6
EU 1 034 1324 1 119 817
Poultrymeat
US 35 - 34,2 28
EU 368 470 440 290
Source: OECD (1995)